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Standards governing the tax lawyer, particularly with respect to tax
return advice and preparation, are more stringent today than ever before.
A myriad of professional and statutory precepts attempt to mediate the
tension between the lawyer's duty to represent a client diligently and the
sometimes conflicting duty to promote the administration of justice (fre-
quently referred to as a "duty to the system").' In 1952, Norris Darrell
summed up the dichotomy by stating, "You of course have a double duty:
a duty to do your best for the client and not to bring the lightning down
upon him, and a duty to live up to your professional responsibility."' 2 The
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1. See 13 BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., STANDARDs OF TAX PRACTICE I 105.02 [here-
inafter STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE]; ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 85-352 (1985) [hereinafter ABA Op. 85-352], reprinted in 39 TAX LAW. 631 (1986);
STANDARDs OF TAX PRACTICE app. 2003.
2. See James R. Rowen, When May a Lawyer Advise a Client That He May Take a
Position on His Tax Return?, 29 TAX LAW. 237, 237 (1976) (quoting statement by Norris
Darvell concerning dual duties of tax lawyers). Justice Holmes warned in another context that
"men must turn square corners when they deal with the government." Rock Island R.R. v.
United States, 254 U.S. 141, 143 (1920).
From early on, commentators have taken divergent positions on the practitioner's tax
return obligations based on differing views of the appropriate emphasis to be placed on the
practitioner's duty to the client as contrasted to a conflicting duty to the system. For example,
Randolph Paul placed a high value on duty to the system. In an early discussion he advanced
a clear duty of disclosure for questionable positions:
There are, however, cases in which there is a clear duty of disclosure which most
tax attorneys would respect. For instance, in spite of the Textile Mills decision, and
the applicable regulation, there remains some chance that legitimate lobbying expenses
are deductible. Yet I think most attorneys would refuse to sanction the deduction
of lobbying expenses in a return without a complete segregation of the deduction so
that it would automatically come to the attention of the revenue agent.
Randolph E. Paul, The Lawyer as Tax Advisor, 25 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 412, 427-28 (1953),
quoted in Rowen, supra, at 238.
In contrast, Mark Johnson, another prominent commentator, emphasized the primacy of
the lawyer's duty to the client:
Surely we must give our client the benefit of all reasonable doubts on the facts and
the law. We of course should communicate to him our expert evaluation of all
reasonable doubts, so that we will be prepared for all contingencies. But once we
are honestly convinced that he has a reasonable basis for an advantageous position,
we can counsel and advocate that position without first satisfying ourselves that we
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standards governing the tax lawyer are often vague, sometimes inconsistent,
and frequently difficult to apply. Nevertheless, the need to make decisions
based on these often slippery standards occurs on a daily basis in tax
practice, and even seemingly mundane situations can be problematical.
Clients do not come to tax lawyers for expensive advice on easy
questions. The lawyer normally must give advice where either the law itself
or the application of the facts to the law is uncertain.' The lawyer must
decide whether a position that is neither clearly correct nor clearly incorrect
may be advanced in the client's favor on the tax return. 4 The lawyer faces
a client who is paying for and expects diligent, even zealous representation
of his' interests. 6 At the same time, the lawyer must abide by standards
that may require him to act in ways that appear, at least to the client, to
be contrary to the client's best interests.
The standards governing a tax attorney's conduct are often clear in the
abstract, but become perplexing in application. The lawyer's natural ten-
would accept that position if we were a revenue agent. That kind of schizophrenia
is not demanded of a lawyer in any other branch of law, and it should be no
different in the tax law. By the same token, if we believe that the taxpayer's position
depends upon a correct, or even reasonably tenable, interpretation of the law, we
do not have to provoke controversy by advertising the grounds on which it might
be attacked.
Mark H. Johnson, Does the Tax Practitioner Owe a Dual Responsibility to His Client and to
the Government?-The Theory, 15 S. CAL. INST. 25, 31-32 (1963), quoted in Rowen, supra,
at 238-39.
3. Kenneth L. Harris, Resolving Questionable Positions on a Client's Federal Tax
Return: An Analysis of the Revised Section 6694(a) Standard, 47 TAX NOTES 971, 972 (1990).
4. Id.
5. This article uses the pronouns he, him, and his in the traditional generic sense to
indicate both the masculine and feminine gender when the antecedent's gender is indeterminate.
See I U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
6. The former American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of Professional Respon-
sibility imposed a duty on the lawyer to represent a client "zealously within the bounds of
the law" (emphasis added). MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsmILrrY Canon 7 (1969).
Likewise the old ABA Canons of professional ethics imposed a duty of "warm zeal" on
behalf of the client. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (1908) (as amended). In
contrast, the latest ABA formulation in the Model Rules requires a lawyer to "act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client." MODEL RULES OF PROFEssIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1992). The comment to Model Rule 1.3 states, "A lawyer should act with
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the
client's behalf." MODEL RUtLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (1992). The rule
itself does not refer to zeal and the comment refers to zeal only in connection with the lawyer's
role as advocate. Id. The change may indicate a movement toward the duty to system concept.
However, the drafters may only have intended to reduce the possibility of "zeal" being
mistaken for "zealotry" and, thereby, preclude an overly aggressive interpretation of the
lawyer's duty to client. See Michael C. Durst, The Tax Lawyer's Professional Responsibility,
39 FLA. L. REv. 1027, 1047 n.74 (1987). The tension between duty to client and duty to the
system is an age-old one, and by no means confined to the tax law area. See Andrew Kaufman,
Book Review, 94 HARv. L. REv. 1504 (1981) (reviewing AL.AN H. GOLDmAN, TnE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL Enmcs (1980)). The philosophical basis of the lawyer-client
relationship is elegantly explored in Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foun-
dations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
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dency is to promote the interests of the client, who is paying the lawyer's
fees-that is, the lawyer has a tendency to be easy on the client. 7 At the
same time, the standards of tax practice impose upon the practitioner a
duty that sometimes makes being easy on the client difficult or impossible.
Hence, to paraphrase the words of a popular country music song, the
practitioner may find that "[ilt's not easy being easy." 8
Congress, the United States Treasury Department (Treasury), and the
American Bar Association (ABA) should promote the policy of consistency
between the various practitioner and taxpayer standards in drafting legis-
lation, regulations, and professional practice standards. Consistency in the
standards will increase the ability of practitioners and taxpayers to comply
with the authorities on which our voluntary self-assessment tax system is
based.
II. OVERVIEW OF GOVERNING STANDARDS
A conglomeration of standards governs the tax lawyer in advising tax
return positions. These standards include statutory standards established by
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (Code), through the
imposition of penalties on taxpayers and on tax return preparers. The Code
imposes duties on lawyers both directly and indirectly, through assessment
of penalties on the client. The principal penalties the lawyer needs to be
concerned with are the accuracy-related penalty imposed directly on the
taxpayer 9 and the preparer penalties imposed on the lawyer who prepares
an erroneous tax return or renders substantial advice with respect to the
preparation of such a return.10
Professional standards also govern the tax lawyer's conduct in advising
tax return positions. State disciplinary rules govern lawyer conduct generally.
These are administered by state disciplinary bodies according to the rules
in each state. State rules, in turn, are greatly influenced by the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct and their predecessors, the Model Code of
7. See Matthew C. Ames, Formal Opinion 352: Professional Integrity and the Tax
Audit Lottery, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETmcs 411, 424-25. Mr. Ames states,
There will always be pressure on the lawyer to give his blessing to a client's position.
The lawyer's natural tendency will be to hedge and waver and convince himself that
the position does have a realistic chance of succeeding, and that it really is held in
good faith.
Id.; Gwen Thayer Handelman, Constraining Aggressive Return Advice, 9 VA. TAx REv. 77,
102-03 (1989) (stating lawyers are "subject to mortal self-deception when self-interest or the
interest of a client is implicated"); Frederic G. Corneel, Guidelines to Tax Practice Second,
43 TAx LAW. 297, 299-300 (1990) (describing lawyer as "stalwart defender of the client's
interests in struggles with the Service").
8. S. HARRINGTON ET AL., WARNER TAMaERLANE PUBLISHING CORP. (Warner Bros.)
(originally sung by Janie Fricke).
9. See I.R.C. § 6662 (West Supp. 1993); infra text accompanying notes 43-90 (discussing
statutory standards for tax return advice).
10. See I.R.C. § 6694 (1988); infra text accompanying notes 91-107 (discussing preparer
penalties).
1993]
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Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics." Al-
though these ABA documents have no binding effect in and of themselves,
state disciplinary systems often adopt them in whole or in part.12 In the tax
area, the ABA has promulgated three influential pronouncements-Opinion
314,13 Opinion 346,14 and Opinion 85-3521 5-- that form the basis for the
professional standards governing tax practice.
6
The Treasury also promulgated standards for practice before the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) in Circular 230.17 The Treasury recently proposed a
revision to Circular 230 encompassing a standard similar to the ABA
"realistic possibility of success standard" promulgated in Opinion 85-352.18
III. A "SIMALE" CASE
Assume that Client has been a limited partner in a real estate investment
activity for several years. Client has participated in the investment activity
more than 500 hours each year, and hence has qualified as a material
participant in the activity under the passive activity loss rules of Code
section 469.19 Client has taken substantial losses against other income over
the past several years due to the real estate investment. Approximately
$1,500,000 of the partnership's nonrecourse liabilities are allocated to Client
under the partnership liability allocation regulations.
20
The partnership is insolvent and Client's partnership interest is basically
worthless. The principal partnership creditor has offered a workout plan
under which it will forgive a portion of the partnership nonrecourse debt
which substantially exceeds the value of the assets securing that debt. The
debt forgiveness will reduce the liability to approximately the fair market
value of the property securing the debt. Client's assets have a fair market
value in excess of Client's liabilities excluding the $1,500,000 partnership
liabilities allocated to Client. However, if the $1,500,000 partnership liabil-
ities allocated to Client are included in the computation, Client's liabilities
exceed Client's assets. The nonrecourse liabilities proposed to be forgiven
11. See STANDARDS OF TAx PRACTICE, supra note 2, 111.
12. See id. 111.02.
13. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965), reprinted in STANDARDS
OF TAx PRACTICE, supra note 1, app. 2001.
14. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1965),
reprinted in STANDARDS OF TAx PRACTICE, supra note 1, app. 2002.
15. ABA Op. 85-352, supra note 1.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 112-77 (discussing ABA Opinion 85-352).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 178-87 (discussing IRS Circular 230).
18. See 31 C.F.R. subtit. A § 10.34 (1992) [hereinafter Circular 230].
19. I.R.C. § 469 (1988); see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(1), (e)(2) (1988) (detailing
requirements for material participation).
20. See I.R.C. § 752 (1988) (explaining treatment of partnership liabilities); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.752-3 (1991) (explaining distribution of nonrecourse liability in partnership). A nonrecourse
liability is one for which "no partner or related person bears the economic risk of loss ......
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a)(2) (1991). A nonrecourse liability is one for which Client has no
personal liability. Id.
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in the workout that are allocable to Client amount to $1,000,000. Hence,
Client faces as much as $1,000,000 in debt forgiveness income, resulting in
an amount of tax liability that will devastate Client financially.2'
The issue is whether Client qualifies for nonrecognition of any or all
the debt forgiveness income under Code section 108, which basically requires
that Client be insolvent to qualify for nonrecognition treatment. 22 Although
the partnership itself is insolvent, the Code clearly requires the taxpayer to
make the determination of insolvency for purposes of Code section 108 at
the partner level rather than the partnership level. 23 The question then
becomes whether Client is insolvent for purposes of Code section 108.
Two statutory provisions bear directly on the problem. First, Code
section 108(d)(1) defines indebtedness of the taxpayer to include any in-
debtedness "subject to which the taxpayer holds property." 24 Second, Code
section 108(d)(3) defines the term insolvent to mean "the excess of liabilities
over the fair market value of assets."' The problem thus narrows to
whether the liabilities included in the calculation under the statutory defi-
21. For simplicity, the example assumes that the partnership will return no property to
the creditor in exchange for the debt forgiveness. When property is exchanged for forgiveness
of nonrecourse debt, the transaction is treated as a sale of the property in an amount equal
to the amount of the liability rather than as a transaction resulting in debt forgiveness income.
See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983) (concluding that sale or disposal of
property encumbered by nonrecourse debt requires inclusion of amount of debt in amount
realized by seller); Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2 (1980) (requiring inclusion of discharged liabilities
in amount realized, from sale of debt encumbered property).
22. I.R.C. § 108(a) (1988) provides in relevant part:
(a) Exclusion from gross income.
(1) In GeneraL.-Gross income does not include any amount which (but for this
subsection) would be includible in gross income by reason of the discharge (in whole
or in part) of indebtedness of the taxpayer if-
(A) the discharge occurs in a title 11 case,
(B) the discharge occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent, or
(C) the indebtedness discharged is qualified farm indebtedness.
Id.
23. Id. § 108(d)(6) provides in relevant part:
Subsections (a), (b), and (g) to be applied at partner level. In the case of a partnership,
subsections (a), (b), and (g) shall be applied at the partner level.
Id.
24. Id. § 108(d)(1)(B). The full text of § 108(d)(l) reads as follows:
(I) Indebtedness of taxpayer.-For purposes of this section, the term "indebtedness
of the taxpayer" means any indebtedness-
(A) for which the taxpayer is liable, or
(B) subject to which the taxpayer holds property.
Id.
25. Id. § 108(d)(3). The full text of the relevant provision reads as follows:
(3) Insolvent.-For purposes of this section, the term "insolvent" means the excess
of liabilities over the fair market value of assets. With respect to any discharge,
whether or not the taxpayer is insolvent, and the amount by which the taxpayer is
insolvent, shall be determined on the basis of the taxpayer's assets and liabilities
immediately before the discharge.
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nition of "insolvent" in Code section 108(d)(3) include the nonrecourse
liabilities allocated to a partner under the partnership liability allocation
rules. This in turn depends on whether "indebtedness of the taxpayer"
under Code section 108(d)(1) includes nonrecourse liabilities when the debt
exceeds the value of the assets.
Appraising the issue, Lawyer notes that the "subject to" phraseology
in Code section 108(d)(1)(B) contraposed to the phrase "for which the
taxpayer is liable" in the preceding phrase clearly refers to nonrecourse debt
as being included in "indebtedness of the taxpayer." However, the statute
says nothing about whether debt allocated under the partnership liability
allocation rules is included in debt "subject to" which the taxpayer holds
property. The only reference to partnerships in Code section 108 is in section
108(d)(6), which requires taxpayers to make determinations under subsection
(a) at the partner, rather than the partnership, level. This provision appears
to be only indirectly relevant. It clearly requires taxpayers to make the
determination of insolvency at the partner level, but it does not say directly
whether partnership nonrecourse liabilities allocated to the partner are to
be taken into account for this purpose. 26
Lawyer reasons that partnership recourse debt allocated to a partner
under the partnership liability allocation rules would be includible in the
computation under Code section 108(d)(1)(A) as debt for which the "tax-
payer is liable," 27 because the recourse liability allocation rules base their
allocations on ultimate economic responsibility for the debt. 2 Lawyer must
then decide whether it is reasonable to conclude that nonrecourse liabilities
allocated to a partner under the same set of rules likewise should be included
in the insolvency computation under Code section 108(d)(1).
In researching the issue, Lawyer first finds a news story concerning the
question of whether nonrecourse debt should be included in the insolvency
computation. The story quotes an IRS official as stating that nonrecourse
debt should be included in the computation, at least to the extent that
nonrecourse debt is forgiven.
29
26. See id. § 108(d)(6) (requiring that determinations under subsections (a), (b), and (g)
of § 108 be made at partner level).
27. Id. § 108(d)(l)(A).
28. See Ed R. Haden, Note, The Final Regulations Under IRC Sections 704(b) and 752:
Envisioning Economic Risk of Loss Through a Glass Darkly, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 487,
510-11 (1992) (explaining that rules allocate liability to partners bearing economic risk of loss).
29. See Questions Arise from Cancellation of Nonrecourse Debt, 51 TAx NoTS 959
(1991) (discussing remarks of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Counsellor to the Commissioner
Thomas Hood). The story stated,
Nonrecourse debt may not be treated the same as recourse debt for purposes
of determining insolvency under section 108(d)(3). Hood discussed the approaches
that the IRS has considered for treatment of nonrecourse debt in insolvency calcu-
lations. He indicated that ignoring nonrecourse debt (entirely) in determining insol-
vency would be unrealistic. It would of course be consistent with Rev. Rul. 91-31
to always include nonrecourse debt in the determination of insolvency, treating both
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Lawyer also finds three recent law review articles dealing with the issue.
These articles conclude that nonrecourse debt should be included in the
calculation at least to the extent of the fair market value of the property
securing the debt plus any additional amount of nonrecourse liability, to
the extent that nonrecourse liability is discharged.30 None of the articles
cites authority directly on point with respect to the issue. However, the
articles do offer well-reasoned analyses of the statute that support the
inclusion of forgiven nonrecourse debt in the insolvency calculation. More-
over, in addition to these secondary sources, Lawyer finds a report of an
ABA Tax Section task force that also supports the inclusion of nonrecourse
liability in the insolvency definition.3
In fact, the task force report goes so far as to state that a good
argument exists that discharge of nonrecourse debt in excess of the fair
market value of property securing the debt is not even includible as discharge
of indebtedness income at all. The task force report cites an old Board of
Tax Appeals case, Fulton Gold Corp. v. Commissioner,2 that can be
interpreted as authority for the proposition that forgiveness of nonrecourse
debt does not result in debt discharge income at all, but rather results only
in a reduction of taxpayer's basis in his partnership interest.33 Lawyer also
finds a footnote in a Supreme Court case, Tufts v. Commissioner3 4 that
cites Fulton Gold and might be interpreted as supporting the Fulton Gold
position that forgiveness of nonrecourse debt results in basis reduction
rather than discharge of indebtedness income. 5
types of debt the same.
Hood alluded to the possibility that nonrecourse debt may not always be
included in this calculation; he might argue that it should be included in the
calculation only when nonrecourse debt is being forgiven. This latter theory is called
the "matching rule" for reasons not immediately apparent.
Id.
30. See Richard M. Lipton, Planning for Noncorporate Debt Workouts Outside of
Bankruptcy, 70 TAxas 275, 289-90 (1992) (discussing arguments for inclusion of contingent
liabilities in insolvency computation); Robert C. Livsey, Determining if a Taxpayer is Insolvent
for Purposes of the COD Income Exclusion, 76 J. TAx'N 224, 227 (1992); Walter D.
Schwidetzky, Partnership Taxation: Restructuring Partnership Debt-Life is Change, 11 VA.
TAX Rav. 523, 536 (1992) (discussing inclusion of nonrecourse debt in I.R.C. § 108 insolvency
computation).
31. See ABA Tax Section, Report of the Section 108 Real Estate and Partnership Task
Force, TAX Nom's TODAY, Aug. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Taxria Library, TNT File.
32. Fulton Gold Corp. v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 519, 520-21 (1934). The case might
also be construed more narrowly as a purchase price adjustment situation. Jeffrey T. Sheffield
& Todd F. Maynes, Selected Tax Issues in Partnership Debt Restructurings, 68 TAXEs 861,
870 n.46 (1990).
33. 31 B.T.A. 519 (1934).
34. 461 U.S. 300 (1983); see Schwidetzky, supra note 30, at 548-50 (discussing footnote
11 of Tufts v. Commissioner, 461 U.S. 300 (1983)).
35. See Tufts v. Commissioner, 461 U.S. at 311 n.11 (1983) (discussing Fulton Gold).
The Court, referring to the freeing of assets theory for discharge of indebtedness income,
stated:
According to that view, when nonrecourse debt is forgiven, the debtor's basis in the
19931
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Finally, Lawyer finds three revenue rulings dealing with forgiveness of
nonrecourse debt. The first ruling holds that debt forgiveness income exists
in a situation where the fair market value of the securing property exceeds
the amount of the debt forgiven.', The second ruling extended the holding
of the first to a situation in which the liability exceeded the fair market
value of the securing property? The results of both these rulings support
a conclusion that the amount of the nonrecourse liability should be included
in the definition of insolvency. Otherwise, treatment of the two situations
would be inconsistent. A debt would be a "taxpayer indebtedness" within
the meaning of Code section 108(d)(1) but would not be a liability of the
taxpayer for purposes of the section 108(d)(6) insolvency definition.
38
The third ruling directly addresses the issue of including nonrecourse
liabilities in the insolvency calculation. It holds that the nonrecourse liability
should be included in the insolvency calculation to the extent of the fair
market value of the property securing the debt plus any nonrecourse liability
in excess of the property's fair market value, to the extent that the
nonrecourse debt is forgiven.39 The debt forgiveness transaction in question
fits the facts of the ruling except in one particular: the ruling deals with
nonrecourse debt of an individual, not that of a partnership.
Hence, the ruling only answers half of Lawyer's question. The ruling
clearly allows nonrecourse debt directly incurred by an individual to be
included in the insolvency calculation. But it does not address the question
of whether the same principle applies to nonrecourse debt allocated to a
partner by the partnership liability allocation rules. Of the other materials
Lawyer has found, only one directly refers to this issue. The Tax Section
task force on section 108, applying a well-reasoned analysis (but not citing
any directly supportive authority), explicitly states that if forgiveness of
nonrecourse debt allocated to a partner is included in income, the nonre-
course debt also should be included in the insolvency definition for purposes
of section 108. 40 Thus, the Section 108 task force report directly supports
Client's position. Assume for purposes of this example that no other
authorities are relevant to the problem.
41
securing property is reduced by the amount of debt canceled.... Fulton Gold Corp
v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 519, 520 (1934).... Similarly, if the nonrecourse
indebtedness exceeds the value of the securing property, the taxpayer never realizes
the full amount of the obligation canceled because the tax law has not recognized
negative basis.
Id. However, the Court's discussion merely explicated the Fulton Gold position without
purporting to endorse it. Id.
36. Rev. Rul. 82-202, 1982-2 C.B. 35, 36. The ruling involved discounted prepayment
of a nonrecourse debt secured by a residence having a fair market value in excess of the debt.
Id. The Service held that discharge of indebtedness income was generated by the transaction.
Id.
37. Rev. Rul. 91-31, 1991-1 C.B. 19, 20.
38. See Lipton, supra note 30, at 290.
39. Rev. Rul. 92-53, 1992-27 I.R.B. 7, 8.
40. ABA Tax Section, supra note 31, at pt. V.
41. The authorities cited are for purposes of illustration only and do not purport to be
the result of exhaustive research into the substantive problem.
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Lawyer is thus left with a less than complete answer to the problem.
Although ample authority exists for the proposition that nonrecourse debt
can be included in the insolvency definition in the case of individual debt,
the only support for extending this principle to the nonrecourse debt
allocated to a partner under the partnership allocation rules is the statement
in the Tax Section section 108 task force report. Still, Lawyer must make
a determination as to whether he can properly advise Client to take the
position on the tax return that Client is insolvent. Client needs to take this
position to be eligible under section 108 for nonrecognition of debt discharge
income resulting from the debt restructuring, a position that Client must
sustain to avoid financial ruin.
What are the ethical and legal considerations that apply to Lawyer in
rendering the tax return advice? The analysis must begin with the funda-
mental premise that the taxpayer is entitled to a prepayment forum in which
to assert his position. This is the raison d'etre of the Tax Court. 42 The
corollary of this is that, at least within some range of possible outcomes,
the taxpayer should be able to assert a position on the tax return that the
Service may well contest, even though the taxpayer's position is not certainly
correct, or perhaps even probably correct. This proposition is not contro-
versial. 43 The next, more difficult question is the degree of certitude with
42. The Tax Court (formerly the Board of Tax Appeals) was created for the specific
purpose of providing the taxpayer a prepayment forum for contesting disputed tax return
positions. The House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee report accompanying
the Revenue Act of 1924 creating the Board of Tax Appeals stated: #
The committee recommends the establishment of a Board of Tax Appeals to which
a taxpayer may appeal prior to the payment of an additional assessment of income,
excess-profits, war profits, or estate taxes. Although a taxpayer may, after payment
of his tax, bring suit for the recovery thereof and thus secure a judicial determination
of the questions involved, he can not, in view of section 3224 of the revised statutes,
which prohibits suit to enjoin the collection of taxes, secure such determination prior
to the payment of the tax. The right of appeal after the payment of the tax is an
incomplete remedy, and does little to remove the hardship occasioned by an incorrect
assessment. The payment of a large additional tax on income received several years
previous and which may have, since its receipt, been either wiped out by subsequent
losses, invested in noniquid assets, or spent, sometimes forces taxpayers into
bankruptcy, and often causes great financial hardship and sacrifice. These results
are not remedied by permitting the taxpayer to sue for the recovery of the tax after
this payment. He is entitled to an appeal and to a determination of.his liability for
the tax prior to its payment.
H.R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. _.(1924) (emphasis added), reprinted in 1939-1
C.B. 241 (Part 2), 246-47.
43. See James P. Holden, Constraining Aggressive Return Advice: A Commentary, 9
VA. TAX REv. 771, 773 (1990). It might be argued that the jurat on the Form 1040 requires
the taxpayer to be certain of a position's correctness. It states:
Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return and accom-
panying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief, they
are true, correct and complete.
IRS Form 1040 (emphasis added). Also, I.R.C. § 7206 (1988) makes it a felony for a person
to willfully make and subscribe to a return "which he does not believe to be true and correct
as to every material matter." Id. § 7206(1) (emphasis added). Nevertheless, the "true and
19931
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respect to the correctness of the taxpayer's position that is required under
the various governing standards in order for Lawyer to be able to advise
and participate in taking that position on the tax return.
A. Statutory Standards
The Code imposes certain standards of tax return advice on the lawyer
to reflect the policy of encouraging voluntary self-assessment. The two
statutory provisions most likely to be relevant to Lawyer's situation are the
accuracy-related penalty44 and the return preparer penalty.
45
1. Accuracy-Related Penalty
The accuracy-related penalty imposes a duty on the taxpayer, not the
lawyer per se. However, a lawyer's duties flow from the legal duty of the
client to comply with the law." The components of the accuracy-related
penalty most relevant to Lawyer's case are the penalties for negligence,47
correct" belief criterion has not prevailed as the required standard, largely because a rule that
depends too much on the taxpayer's subjective state of mind would not be workable. See
Rowen, supra note 2, at 250-51. However, at least one commentator has argued for a "true
and correct" standard of reporting. See generally Calvin Johnson, 'True and Correct:
Standards for Tax Return Reporting, 43 TAx NoTEs 1521 (1989).
44. I.R.C. § 6662 (West Supp. 1993). The Improved Penalty Administration and Tax
Compliance Act of 1989 (IMPACT) combined the penalties formerly contained in several
sections, including the negligence, disregard of rules and regulations, substantial understatement,
and valuation overstatement penalties into a single section and styled all these penalties
"Accuracy-related Penalties." Notwithstanding, they remain discrete penalties with different
standards for application. However, the accuracy-related penalties (basically imposed at a 20%
rate) cannot be cumulated. That is, no more than one of the accuracy-related penalties will
apply to a given understatement of tax. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-2(c) (1991). The portions of
I.R.C. § 6662 that impose the penalty read as follows:
(a) Imposition of penalty.-If this section applies to any portion of an underpayment
of tax required to be shown on a return, there shall be added to the tax an amount
equal to 20 percent of the portion of the underpayment to which this section applies.
(b) Portion of underpayment to which section applies.-This section shall apply to
the portion of any underpayment which is attributable to 1 or more of the following:
(1) Negligence or disregard of rules or regulations.
(2) Any substantial understatement of income tax.
Id. § 6662(a)-(b)(2) (West Supp. 1993).
45. I.R.C. § 6694 (West Supp. 1993). I.R.C. § 6695 imposes another set of complementary
penalties that are not considered here. They are for (1) failure to furnish taxpayer a copy of
the return, § 6695(a); (2) failure to sign return, § 6695(b); (3) failure to furnish identifying
number, § 6695(c); (4) failure to retain copies or list of returns, § 6695(d); (5) failure to file
correct information returns, § 6695(e); (6) improper negotiation of refund check, § 6695(0.
I.R.C. § 6695(a)-(f) (West Supp. 1993).
46. See STANDARDS OF TAx PRATCE, supra note 1, 205, 208; Harris, supra note 3,
at 975; Holden, supra note 43, at 774; Handelman, supra note 7, at 89; Durst, supra note 6,
at 1028-30.
47. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1) (West Supp. 1993).
ADVISING RETURN POSITIONS
disregard of rules and regulations," and substantial understatement. 49 The
penalties are not cumulative. If the requirements for imposing a penalty are
met, for example, if the amount of tax involved is large enough to implicate
the substantial understatement penalty, that penalty will apply. If the
requirements for imposing the substantial understatement penalty are not
met, the negligence or disregard penalty may apply. Both penalties will not
apply to the same understatement. 0
a. Negligence and Disregard of Rules and Regulations
Negligence includes any failure to make a reasonable attempt to comply
with the revenue laws or to exercise ordinary and reasonable care in the
preparation of a tax return.5 1 Courts have generally applied the tort law
"reasonably prudent" test in determining taxpayer negligence. 2 The rea-
sonably prudent test requires the taxpayer to show a reasonable basis for
the return position. 3 A return position that is "arguable, but fairly unlikely
48. Id. Disregard of rules or regulations includes any careless, reckless or intentional
disregard of rules or regulations. Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(2) (1991). Rules or regulations
include: provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (Code), temporary or
final (but not proposed) Treasury regulations issued under the Code, and revenue rulings or
notices (other than notices of proposed rulemaking). Id. Comments on the proposed regulations
criticized inclusion of revenue rulings on the list of "rules or regulations" because (1) a revenue
ruling does not constitute a "rule" under the Administrative Procedure Act, and (2) a revenue
ruling is only the contention of one party and is not subject to the give-and-take of a public
comment process. T.D. 8381, 1992-1 C.B. 374, 377 [hereinafter T.D. 8381]. The IRS rejected
this objection based on the legislative history of the 1976 Tax Reform Act and the fact that
revenue rulings were expressly listed as "rules" under former Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-1 (1991)
(concerning preparer penalties). T.D. 8381, supra, at 377. The regulations do not explicitly
include Revenue Procedures on the list. However, the preamble states that revenue procedures
are not listed because "they may or may not be treated as 'rules or regulations' depending on
all facts and circumstances." Id. This provides scant guidance, but presumably revenue
procedures that contain substantive rules will be "rules" for this purpose while revenue
procedures that contain mere directions to IRS personnel (for instance, requirements for
information to be furnished in obtaining a ruling) will not be "rules."
49. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2), (d) (West Supp. 1993).
50. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-2(c) (1991); Lawrence Zelenak, Reforming Penalty Reform:
Congress Should Eliminate the Profusion of Accuracy Standards, 52 TAX NoTES 471, 471-72
(1991). Also, the accuracy-related penalty does not apply to any portion of an underpayment
that is due to fraud. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-2(a) (1991). The accuracy-related penalty applies
only if a return is filed, but both the I.R.C. § 6651 (1988) failure to file penalty and the
accuracy-related penalty may be applied to a late return. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-2(a) (1991).
51. Id. § 1.6662-3(b)(1) (1991).
52. E.g., Heasley v. Commissioner, 96 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1992); Sammons v. Commis-
sioner, 838 F.2d 330, 337 (9th Cir. 1988); Marcello v. Commissioner, 380 F.2d 499, 506 (5th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1044 (1968); Bowman v. Commissioner, 1987-45 T.C.M.
(CCH); see STArDARDs OF TAx PACTICE, supra note 1, 208.031.
53. See Treas Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1); Sheldon I. Banoff, Final Regulations on Accuracy
Related Penalties: Taxpayers Beware, The Feds Are Out There/There's Danger in the Air-
Be Aggressive If You Dare, 70 TAxEs 178, 182 (1992).
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to prevail in court" satisfies the reasonable basis standard. 4 Expressed in
percentage terms, a reasonable basis probably requires about a ten to twenty
percent chance of success if litigated." The taxpayer has the burden of
proof on the issue of negligence.16 Hence, to avoid the negligence penalty,
the taxpayer needs to show that there was a reasonable basis for the return
position taken. In addition, the negligence penalty can be avoided by making
adequate disclosure of the return position, provided the position is not
frivolous
s7
Would Client's proposed position be in any danger of incurring the
negligence penalty? Most likely not. There at least seems to be a reasonable
basis for the position. The inclusion of nonrecourse debt in the insolvency
definition is supported directly by a revenue ruling. Moreover, there is at
least an argument that the debt forgiveness does not even result in discharge
54. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (1991) (stating that arguable position satisfies reasonable
basis standard); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1) (1991) (providing that negligence penalty is
inapplicable to positions for which taxpayer has reasonable basis).
55. See Sheldon L. Banoff & Harve PL. Coustan, Final Regulations on Return Preparer
Penalties: IRS Refuses to Deal, Preparers' Fears prove to BE Real/Penalty Roulette-Roll the
Wheel/Who Knows How the Courts Will Feel, 70 TAxEs 137, 175 (1992). The efficacy of
using percentages to enunciate return position standards is subject to question. See infra text
accompanying notes 201-03.
56. STACDAPDs OF TAX PRACTiCE, supra note 1, 208.0311; e.g., Marcello, 380 F.2d at
506; Enoch v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 781, 802 (1972) (holding IRS negligence determination
prima facie correct and burden on taxpayer to establish IRS error).
57. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c) (1991) (explaining disclosure required to avoid negligence
penalty). This regulation provides detail with respect to the requirements for adequate disclosure
to avoid the negligence penalty. The disclosure defense does not apply if the position is
frivolous. Id. A position is frivolous if it is "patently improper." Id. § 1.6662-3(b)(3).
Comments on the proposed regulations criticized this definition for not including a bad faiflh
component. The IRS rejected these comments on the ground that a purely objective standard
was most appropriate. "Patently improper" may not really be an objective standard. The IRS
also rejected a suggested "not litigable" test as too lawyer oriented. T.D. 8381, 1992-1 C.B.
374, 377. A recent proposal by the Clinton Administration would replace the "not frivolous"
standard with a "reasonable basis" standard. TREAsuRY DEPARTMENT, SUMMARY OF TM
ADMRNTRATION's REVENUE PROPOSALS 68 (1993).
Disclosure must be made on a properly completed Form 8275. The regulations do not
provide for avoidance of the negligence or disregard penalties by disclosure in accordance with
an annual revenue procedure. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3 (1991). Neither do the regulations provide
for disclosure by means of a statement attached to the return. Id. Disclosure of recurring
items such as the basis of depreciable property must be made in each year in which the item
is taken into account. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(f)(3) (1991). In the case of carrybacks and
carryovers, disclosure is adequate with respect to an item which is included in any loss,
deduction or credit that is carried to another year (carryback or cirryover year) only if made
in connection with the return for the year in which the carryback or carryover arises (loss or
credit year). Disclosure is not also required in connection with the return for the carryback or
carryover year. Id. § 6662-4(f)(4). Disclosure in the case of items attributable to pass-through
entities is generally made on the return of the pass-through entity. An individual partner or S
corporation shareholder also may make such disclosure. The taxpayer must attach the disclosure
to the taxpayer's individual return and also file a copy with the IRS Center with which the
return of the entity is required to be filed. Id. § 1.6662-4(0(5).
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of indebtedness income at all, based on the Fulton Gold case.58 Fulton Gold
has not been overruled explicitly by another court (although it has been
repudiated in a revenue ruling),5 9 and the Supreme Court cited Fulton Gold
in Tufts.6 Moreover, learned commentary and a statement of an IRS official
support the taxpayer's position.6' This seems at least to make the position
"arguable," the standard articulated in the regulations on the negligence
component of the accuracy-related penalty, 62 with at least a ten to twenty
percent chance of success. Likewise, there seems no danger of incurring the
disregard of rules and regulations component of the accuracy-related penalty.
There is no disregard of any rule or regulation on this aspect of the position.
In fact, a revenue ruling exists that supports the taxpayer's position.
However, the facet of the taxpayer's position that extends the use of
nonrecourse liability in the insolvency definition to the nonrecourse liabilities
allocated to a partner under the partnership liability allocation rules presents
more of a problem. Only one of the sources Lawyer relied upon deals
explicitly with this issue. The ABA Tax Section task force report on Code
section 108 directly supports Client's position. 6 Lawyer also gleans from
the articles and the IRS official's statement that the premise underlying
Revenue Ruling 92-5364 is that it is appropriate to include nonrecourse
liabilities in the insolvency calculation when that same nonrecourse debt is
the source of the discharge of indebtedness income. It would be inconsistent
to require inclusion in income of nonrecourse debt forgiveness, while at the
same time excluding the very same nonrecourse debt from calculation of
the taxpayer's liabilities for purposes of determining whether the taxpayer
is insolvent under section 108. The regulations under section 752 do allocate
the liabilities to Client.65 However, these allocation rules are by their terms
directed at determination of a partner's basis in his partnership interest
under section 752."
58. See supra text accompanying notes 29-37 (discussing argument that debt forgiveness
does not result in discharge of debt income).
59. Rev. Rul. 92-53, supra note 39.
60. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing Tufts).
61. Although the substantial authority penalty and the tax return preparer penalty exclude
learned commentary and statements of IRS officials from the list of permissible authorities,
see Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (1991); Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(2) (1991), the regulations
do not so limit the permissible authorities under the negligence penalty. See Treas. Reg. §
1.6662-3 (1991); Sheldon I. Banoff, Dealing with the "Authorities'" Determining Valid Legal
Authority In Advising Clients, Rendering Opinions, Preparing Tax Returns, and Avoiding
Penalties, 66 T~xas 1072, 1120 (1988). Moreover, consulting such sources would seem to
demonstrate reasonable care. In fact, the failure to do so might be evidence of negligence.
See Harris, supra note 3, at 973; Theodore C. Falk, Tax Ethics, Legal Ethics and Real Ethics:
A Critique of ABA Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAX LAW. 643 (1986).
62. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (1991).
63. See supra text accompanying note 40.
64. See supra note 39.
65. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-3 (1991).
66. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(a) (1991) ("This section provides general rules governing
the application of section 752, including rules for determining a partner's share of the liabilities
of the partnership").
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Are the liability allocation rules at all applicable in the section 108
context? At least a plausible argument exists that they are if the section
752 rules are applicable to allocate liabilities to a partner for the purpose
of finding the presence of debt forgiveness income under section 61(a)(12),
which requires inclusion of "[i]ncome from discharge of indebtedness." 6 7
Moreover, if one applies the aggregate theory of partnerships,6 it makes
sense to allocate the liabilities in question to the individual partners.
Taking all the foregoing into account, Lawyer probably would decide
that the taxpayer is not exposed to the negligence or disregard penalties by
taking the proposed position. There appears to be at least a reasonable
basis for the position. Moreover, Client may also have a reasonable cause
and good faith defense (RCGF) against the negligence penalty if Client
relied on Lawyer's advice. A determination of whether taxpayer qualifies
for RCGF is made on the basis of facts and circumstances. The most
important factor is the extent of the taxpayer's effort to assess the taxpayer's
proper tax liability. Reliance on the advice of a professional does not
necessarily demonstrate RCGF. However, reliance on professional advice
does constitute RCGF if the taxpayer's reliance was reasonable and the
taxpayer acted in good faith.69
Hence, Client probably could take the position without making disclo-
sure and still not risk incurring the negligence or disregard penalties.
However, this does not resolve Lawyer's problem as to whether Lawyer
may advise Client to take the position. The reasonable basis standard is
lower than the standards required for Lawyer to be able to advise Client
to take the position. Lawyer still must consider the substantial understate-
ment penalty, the ABA Opinion 85-352 standard, and the tax return preparer
penalty.
b. Substantial Understatement
If any portion of an underpayment of any income tax is attributable
to a substantial understatement of such income tax, there is added to the
tax an amount equal to twenty percent of such portion.70 Except with respect
to a tax shelter, an understatement is reduced by the portion of the
understatement: for which there is substantial authority, or with respect to
which there is adequate disclosure. 71 An understatement is substantial if it
67. I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (1988).
68. The aggregate theory considers a partnership to be merely an aggregate of its
individual members. This contrasts with the entity theory, which considers the partnership a
separate entity from the individual partners. The provisions of Code Subchapter K represent
a combination the aggregate and entity theories. See I WILLiAM S. MCKEE ET AL, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF PATNERSIMS AND PARTNERS 1.02 (2d ed. 1990).
69. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b) (1991).
70. See I.R.C. § 6662(a), (b)(2) (West Supp. 1993); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(a) (1991).
71. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(a) (1991). For example, T files a 1992 income tax return
showing taxable income of $20,000 and a tax liability of $6,000 (assuming a 30% tax rate).
Audit adjustments increase the taxable income to $50,000 and the tax liability to $15,000.
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exceeds the greater of (1) ten percent of the tax required to be shown on
the return for the taxable year or (2) five thousand dollars (ten thousand
dollars in the case of a corporation other than an S corporation or a
personal holding company). 72
With respect to a tax shelter, items are treated as if they were shown
properly on the return only if substantial authority for the position exists
and the taxpayer reasonably believed at the time the return was filed that
the taxpayer's position was more likely than not the proper tax treatment.
73
A taxpayer is considered to have reasonably believed that the tax treatment
of an item is more likely than not the proper tax treatment if (1) the
taxpayer analyzed the pertinent facts and authorities and reasonably con-
cluded that there is a greater than fifty percent likelihood that the tax
treatment of the item will be upheld if challenged by the IRS, or (2) the
taxpayer, in good faith, relied on the opinion of a professional tax advisor.
In the latter case, the opinion must be based on the advisor's analysis of
the pertinent facts and authorities and the opinion must state unambiguously
that the advisor concludes that a greater than fifty percent likelihood exists
that the tax treatment of the item will be upheld if challenged by the IRS.74
To be a tax shelter with respect to the substantial understatement penalty,
the principal purpose of the investment, based on objective evidence, must
be to avoid or evade federal income tax.
75
Lawyer determines that the principal purpose of the investment was not
to avoid or evade federal taxes. Hence, to avoid the substantial understate-
ment penalty, Client must disclose the position in accordance with the
regulations, show substantial authority supporting the position, or show
reasonable cause and good faith.
Adequate disclosure generally requires that the position be reported on
Form 8275, sometimes referred to as the "Please Audit Me Now" form. 76
In some instances, for purposes of the substantial understatement penalty
but not the negligence penalty, 77 a taxpayer may be able to make disclosure
Substantial authority existed for a non-tax shelter item that accounted for $8,000 of the
$30,000 increase in taxable income. The amount of tax shown on T's return is determined as
if the item for which substantial authority existed had been given proper treatment. Hence,
the amount of tax treated as shown on T's return is $8,400 (30% of $28,000). The amount
of the understatement is $6,600 ($15,000 required to be shown on the return minus $8,400
treated as shown on the return). The amount of the penalty would be $1,320 (20% of $6,600).
STANDmAs OF TAX PRACTicE, supra note 1, 208.0312. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-
4(d)(1) (1991).
72. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1993); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(b) (1991).
73. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1993); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(1) (1991).
74. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(4) (1991). Disclosure made with respect to a tax shelter
item does not affect the amount of an understatement.
75. See I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii) (West Supp. 1993); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g)(2)(i)
(1991). An item is a tax shelter item if the item is directly or indirectly attributable to the
principal purpose of a tax shelter to avoid or evade federal income tax. See Treas. Reg. §
1.6662-4(g)(3).
76. See Treas. Reg. § 1.66624(0(1) (1991).
77. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c)(2) (1991).
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on the return itself in accordance with applicable forms and instructions. 78
Revenue Procedure 92-2379 currently provides authorization for such disclo-
sure in certain circumstances. However, Lawyer determines that Client's
situation is not one of the circumstances listed in the revenue procedure.
The statute also seems to sanction disclosure on a "statement attached
to the return."8 0 However, no provision exists in the regulations for disclo-
sure on a statement attached to the return. The regulations take the position
that if the Revenue Procedure does not provide for disclosure of an item,
disclosure is adequate only if made on Form 8275 (or Form 8275-R in the
case of a position contrary to a regulation).' Hence, unless Client files
Form 8275 (thereby inviting increased IRS scrutiny), Client must be able to
show that substantial authority exists for the position in order to avoid the
substantial understatement penalty.
Consequently, Lawyer must determine whether Client has substantial
authority for the position. The revenue rulings clearly are authority under
the regulation. The cases are also authority because Fulton Gold, although
an old case, has not been overruled by the Tax Court or a United States
Court of Appeals. Its age is relevant to the degree of its persuasiveness,
not to whether it is authority at all.12 Moreover, the Improved Penalty
Administration and Compliance Tax Act of 1989 (IMPACT) expanded the
definition of substantial authority to include materials such as private letter
rulings and General Explanations of tax legislation by the Joint Committee
on Taxation (Blue Books). 3
78. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(0(2) (1991).
79. Rev. Proc. 92-23, 1992-13 I.R.B. 21.
80. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1993) provides for reduction of the under-
statement on which the penalty is based by that portion of the understatement attributable to
"any item with respect to which the relevant facts affecting the item's tax treatment are
adequately disclosed in the return or in a statement attached to the return." Id. (emphasis
added).
81. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(f)(2) (1991) (stating that if no procedure for disclosure
exists, disclosure is adequate only if made on forms 8275 (Disclosure Statement) or 8275R
(Regulation Disclosure Statement)). Comments on the proposed regulations criticized the
regulation's failure to state that taxpayers could disclose on a statement attached to the return.
Comments pointed out that the statute itself seems to authorize such disclosure and that
Schirmer v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 277 (1987), indicated that forms of disclosure other than
those currently listed in the regulations are acceptable. See Banoff, supra note 49, at 200-01
(discussing how regulations limit acceptable forms of disclosure). The IRS responded to these
criticisms by stating that IMPACT gives no indication that Congress intended to permit
disclosure on the return itself, and it is in the interest of both taxpayers and IRS to have a
uniform disclosure regime. Id. at 201; T.D. 8381, supra note 48, at 67,494.
82. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii), (iii) (1991).
83. The types of authority that may be used in determining if substantial authority exists
are:
1. Applicable provisions of the Code and other statutory provisions;
2. Proposed, temporary, and final regulations construing such statutes;
3. Revenue rulings and revenue procedures;
4. Tax treaties and regulations thereunder, and Treasury Department and other
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However, Lawyer's problem is that none of the permissible authorities
under the substantial understatement penalty directly addresses the question
of how the section 108 insolvency definition is to be applied in the context
of nonrecourse debt of a limited partner. The ABA Tax Sections's section
108 task force report supports Client's position on this issue, but its
conclusions are not permissible authority for the purpose of establishing
substantial authority.
The regulations still exclude from the definition of authority conclusions
reached in materials such as treatises, articles and other learned commen-
tary. 4 Therefore, the conclusions reached in the articles and by the task
force are not themselves authority. Nonetheless, the regulations also provide
that the authorities "underlying such expressions of opinion" may give rise
to substantial authority and that a taxpayer may have substantial authority
for a "position that is supported only by a well-reasoned construction of
the applicable statutory provision."85 The opinions expressed in these articles
and by the task force are based on well-reasoned constructions of the
statute. Hence, the "well-reasoned" constructions of the statute contained
in the articles may qualify as substantial authority under a broad reading
of these regulations provisions. 6
Therefore, Lawyer may conclude that a plausible statutory construction
supports Client's position, based on the aggregate theory of partnership
taxation and on Code section 752 with its accompanying regulations. Is this
enough to constitute substantial authority? The theory sounds good, but it
basically depends on lawyer's own analysis of the relationship of Subchapter
K to Code section 108. This in turn depends on Lawyer's assumptions
regarding the nature and premises of Code section 752 and its accompanying
regulations. Clearly, Lawyer is at least beginning to touch on the realm of
abstract theory and speculation here.
official explanations of such treaties;
5. Court cases;
6. Congressional intent, as reflected in committee reports, joint explanatory state-
ments of managers included in conference committee reports, and floor statements
made prior to enactment by one of a bill's managers;
7. General Explanations of tax legislation prepared by the Joint Committee on
Taxation (the Blue Book);
8. Private letter rulings and technical advice memoranda issued after October 31,
1976;
9. Actions on Decisions (AODs) and General Counsel Memoranda (GCMs) issued
after March 12, 1981;
10. CMs published in pre-1955 volumes of the Cumulative Bulletin;
11. IRS information or press releases;
12. Notices, announcements and other administrative pronouncements published by
the IRS in the Cumulative Bulletin.
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iii) (1991).
84. Id.
85. Id. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (1991).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 63-68 (discussing liability allocation rules to
taxpayer in partnership context).
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Perhaps Lawyer can approach the problem by appraising the percentage
chance of success of Client's position. Neither the statute nor the regulations
themselves place a percentage number on the substantial authority stadard.
However, the regulations under the preparer penalty say that a realistic
possibility of success requires a one-in-three chance of success.8 7 Further-
more, the regulations under the accuracy-related penalty state that the
substantial authority standard is less stringent than a 50 percent likelihood
of success, but more stringent than a "reasonable basis.""8
General agreement exists that substantial authority is a more stringent
standard than the one-in-three realistic possibility of success standard. 9 That
would put the percentage chance of success required at more than one in
three, but less than one half, perhaps about forty percent. 9° This is vague
guidance at best when the law is not clear.91 At worst, it degenerates into
the kind of metaphysical speculation that characterized the corruption of
Scholastic philosophy (how many pure spirits can dance on the head of a
pin?). Moreover, the substantial authority standard, as enunciated in the
statute, is phrased in qualitative rather than quantitative terms, so that a
percentage formulation of the substantial authority standard may not be
appropriate at all.92
Lawyer also might rely on the reasonable cause and good faith exception.
The same considerations apply in the case of the substantial understatement
87. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b) (1991) (discussing procedure for liability determination
of tax preparer).
88. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (1991) (discussing substantial authority standard).
This is apparently based on the legislative history of the substantial understatement penalty.
H.R. REP. No. 97-760, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 309-10 (1982), reprinted in 1982-2 C.B. 650
(discussing expected court interpretation of "substantial understatement").
89. See Zelenak, supra note 50, at 473-74; Holden, supra note 43, at 772; Banoff, supra
note 61, at 1127; Durst, supra note 6, at 1042. ABA Op. 85-352 assumes that realistic possibility
is a lower standard than substantial authority. ABA Op. 85-352, supra note 1, reprinted in 39
TAx LAw. at 632-34.
90. See Banoff, supra note 61, at 1127-28 (discussing odds or chances of success under
various legal standards).
91. See Lin M. Trucksess, Note, Painting the Gray Zone Grayer: Why Substantial
Authority Fails as a Replacement for Practitioner Conduct Under Circular 230, 8 VA. TAX
REv. 743, 759 (1989):
[Hiow should practitioners weigh large quantities of conflicting authority on a
tax position. At what point is support "substantial"? Since substantial authority is
"less" than a "more likely than not" standard (which is a greater-than-50% chance
of success standard) but more than a "reasonable basis" standard (which some
estimate as a greater-than-20% chance of success), how is a practitioner to know
when he has satisfied the requisite percentage?
Id.
92. The statute and regulations basically address the kind and weight of authority
required, not the percentage chance of success. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i) (West Supp. 1993);
Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d) (1991); Sheldon I. Banoff, Determining and Weighing Valid Legal
Authority to Avoid Accuracy-Related and Preparer Penalties: The Proposed Regulations
Continue the Controversy, 69 TAXEs 259, 277 (1991); Falk, supra note 61, at 657.
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penalty as apply in the case of the negligence penalty discussed above. 93
Since Lawyer has acted diligently and in good faith, Client may be able to
rely on the RCGF defense.
2. Preparer Penalty
Code section 6694, as amended by IMPACT, imposes penalties on a
tax return preparer where a position on a return falls below certain stan-
dards. Specifically, section 6694(a) imposes a penalty of $250 per return on
a tax return preparer when any part of an understatement of liability "is
due to a position for which there was not a realistic possibility of being
sustained on its merits." 94 The penalty does not apply if the position is not
frivolous and is disclosed adequately.95 Section 6694 also imposes a penalty
on the tax return preparer when any part of an understatement of liability
is due to a willful attempt to understate the tax liability or a reckless or
intentional disregard of rules or regulations by the income tax return
preparer.96
The term "income tax preparer" generally includes any person who
prepares or employs anyone else to prepare, for compensation, an income
tax return or claim for refund of income tax or "a substantial portion" of
a return or claim for refund. 97 The term encompasses one who renders
advice "directly relevant" to the determination of the existence, character-
ization or amount of an entry on a return, provided that the entry constitutes
93. See supra text accompanying note 70 (describing 20% substantial understatement
penalty). Some commentators have suggested that the substantial understatement penalty is
basically a no-fault penalty. See STANDARDS or TAx PRACTICE, supra note 1, 208.0312
(describing substantial understatement penalty as no-fault penalty); Durst, supra note 6, at
1065-73 (describing congressional motivations for creating substantial understatement penalty).
Note that to the extent a defense of reasonable cause or good faith (RCGF) is available, the
substantial understatement penalty ceases pro tanto to be a no-fault penalty.
94. I.R.C. § 6694(a)(1) (West Supp. 1993). The portion of IRC § 6694 that imposes the
penalty reads as follows:
(a) Understatements Due to Unrealistic Positions.-If--
(1) any part of any understatement of liability with respect to any return or
claim for refund is due to a position for which there was not a realistic possibility
of being sustained on its merits,
(2) any person who is an income tax return preparer with respect to such return
or claim knew (or reasonably should have known) of such position, and
(3) such position was not disclosed as provided in section 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii) or
was frivolous,
such person shall pay a penalty of $250 with respect to such return or claim unless
it is shown that there is reasonable cause for the understatement and such person
acted in good faith.
I.R.C. § 6694(a)(l)-(3) (West Supp. 1993).
95. I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3) (West Supp. 1993). In the case of a preparer who is required to
sign a tax return, the regulations under § 6694 incorporate by reference the disclosure standards
of Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(0. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(3) (1992).
96. I.R.C. § 6694(b) (West Supp. 1993).
97. I.R.C. § 7701(a)(36)(A) (West Supp. 1993).
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a substantial portion of the return.98 Undoubtedly, Client's potential debt
forgiveness income is a substantial item for purposes of the preparer
penalty.9 Hence, Lawyer could be exposed to the preparer penalty.
No willful intent to understate tax liability exists here; nor does any
reckless or intentional disregard of rules or regulations exist.' °° Consequently,
the only likely basis for imposition of the preparer penalty is failure to
meet the realistic possibility of success (RPOS) standard. A position is
considered to have a realistic possibility of success if a reasonable and well-
informed analysis would lead a person knowledgeable in the tax law to
conclude that the position has approximately a one-in-three, or greater,
likelihood of being sustained on its merits.'0
This one-in-three percentage presumably is based on the interpretation
of the RPOS standard set out in the ABA Tax Section task force that
interpreted ABA Opinion 85-352. However, it differs from the ABA RPOS
standard in at least two respects: (1) The ABA RPOS standard, as interpreted
by the Tax Section task force, seemed to establishthe one-in-three percentage
as a safe harbor, while the section 6694 regulations prescribes the one-in-
three percentage as a minimum; 0 2 and (2) The authorities that can be
considered under the section 6694 RPOS standard are confined to those
that can be considered for purposes of the substantial understatement
penalty, 0 13 while the authorities that can be considered under the ABA RPOS
standard include all those that might be considered by a court in making a
decision, including authorities such as treatises and articles.104 Hence, the
section 6694 RPOS in reality may be closer to the substantial understatement
standard than to the ABA RPOS. 105
The considerations with respect to exposure to the preparer penalty thus
are similar to those concerning the substantial understatement penalty, except
98. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(b)(1) (1992). This rule can make potential liability quite
extensive, especially for practitioners who render advice with respect to pass-through'returns.
For example, a practitioner who renders advice with respect to a partnership return may be
liable for the penalty on the returns filed by individual partners if the item is substantial in
relation to other items on the partners' returns. See Goulding v. United States, 957 F.2d 1420
(7th Cir. 1992) (holding partnership liable for penalty assessed against individual partners).
99. Whether an item is substantial is determined by considering the length, complexity
and amount of the entry compared to the length, complexity and amount of the return or
claim for refund as a whole. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(b)(1) (1992).
100. See supra text accompanying note 64 (noting that return position is supported by
revenue ruling).
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1) (1992). The one-in-three odds are to be assessed without
regard to the chance that the position may not be discovered. Id.
102. See infra text accompanying notes 147-49 (noting that one-in-three percentage is
minimum standard under Code § 6694 but safe harbor under Tax Section task force report).
103. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(2) (1992).
104. See infra text accompanying notes 157-59 (describing authorities preparer may rely
on to meet RPOS standard).
105. See William Raby, Salting the Voluntary Assessment System, 54 TAx No.s 187,
189 (1992) (suggesting Code § 6694 RPOS standard resembles substantial understatement
standard).
ADVISING RETURN POSITIONS
that the percentage chance of success required to avoid the preparer penalty
is about 33 percent, whereas the percentage chance of success required to
avoid the substantial understatement penalty is somewhat higher (assuming
that a percentage of success standard is even appropriate under the sub-
stantial understatement penalty). Additionally, the preparer penalty is im-
posed directly on the preparer, not on the taxpayer. Here the application
of the preparer penalty is uncertain for the same reasons as the application
of the substantial understatement penalty-the only authority directly on
point concerning the inclusion of partnership liabilities in the insolvency
definition is excluded from the list of permissible authorities for purposes
of Code section 6694.'
6
Lawyer can also defend against the preparer penalty by making an
adequate disclosure of the position, provided the position is not frivolous.
1°7
Generally, the disclosure requirements are the same as the requirements for
disclosure to avoid the substantial understatement penalty. To be adequate,
disclosure must be on Form 8275 (or 8275-R) or in accordance with an
annual revenue procedure.
08
Finally, Lawyer might defend on the ground that there was "reasonable
cause" for the understatement and Lawyer acted in good faith. Factors to
consider under the reasonable cause or good faith (RCGF) defense include
the complexity of the issue, its materiality, and whether Lawyer followed
good office practice. 109 Lawyer also can make the RCGF defense by showing
that Lawyer relied on the advice of another preparer whom Lawyer had
reason to believe was competent to render such advice. The RCGF advice
cannot come from a person in the same firm as the preparer. 10 The latter
rule may place a premium on obtaining advice from outside counsel."' Here
Lawyer, to obtain protection under the RCGF defense, would have to seek
an opinion from outside counsel. This obviously would add to the cost of
giving the advice to Client.
106. See Treas. Reg § 1.6694-2(b)(2) (1992) (listing permissible authorities for purposes of
Code § 6694); supra text accompanying notes 82-86 (same).
107. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c) (1992).
108. Id. § 1.6694-2(c)(3)(i) (1992). Special disclosure rules also exist for'nonsigning
preparers. Id. § 1.6694-2(c)(3)(ii).
109. Id. § 1.6694-2(d).
110. The regulations provide that there can be only one preparer per firm. Id. § 1.6694-
l(b)(1). Hence, no other person in the preparer's firm can also be a preparer. The regulations
require that the person giving the RCGF advice be a preparer. Therefore, the RCGF advice
cannot come from another person in the same firm as the preparer asserting the RCGF
defense. See Raby, supra note 102, at 188 (describing "one preparer per firm" rule).
111. Raby, supra note 105, at 188. This may result in increased business for some firms.
One commentator tells of
at least one law firm/tax boutique that anticipates a sharp upswing in its revenue
from what it calls "concurring opinions" for CPAs, EAs, and other preparers. The
firm reasons that, in the past, preparers in medium-size and large firms primarily
relied on others within their own firms for concurring opinions when they were
faced with problems that had no obvious answers.
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B. ABA Opinion 85-352
Lawyer also must consider the ethical rules governing the practice of
law. Although each state has its own binding ethical rules, the ABA Model
Rules and their interpretations are highly influential in applying the state
rules.1 2 The ethical standards governing advice with respect to tax practice
are promulgated mainly in three formal ABA opinions: (1) Opinion 314,
dealing with controversies and with tax return positions;" 3 (2) Opinion 346,
dealing with tax shelter opinions;" 4 and (3) Opinion 85-352, dealing with
tax return positions. Lawyer is primarily concerned with Opinion 85-352."
5
The standards of tax practice for attorneys were first formalized in
Opinion 314,116 issued in 1965. Opinion 314 dealt with both advising clients
on tax return positions and dealing with the IRS after an audit has begun.
Opinion 314 still has effect with respect to dealing with the IRS after an
audit has begun, because Opinion 85-352 superseded Opinion 314 only to
the extent that Opinion 85-352 sets out new standards for advising tax
return positions."
7
Opinion 314 stated that the status of the IRS was basically that of an
adversary at both the return and audit stages." 8 According to Opinion 314,
the IRS is a "representative of one of the parties" and not a "true tribunal,
nor even a quasi-judicial institution."" 9 The lawyer in audit situations has
a duty "not to make false assertions of fact."' 20 Moreover, the lawyer "is
under a duty not to mislead the Internal Revenue Service deliberately and
affirmatively, either by misstatements or by silence or by permitting his
client to mislead. '"121 Nevertheless, "as an advocate before a service which
itself represents the adversary point of view" the lawyer is under no duty
to disclose weaknesses in the client's case.'2
Opinion 314 carried its view of the IRS as adversary to the tax return
preparation stage. According to Opinion 314, a lawyer asked to advise a
client in the course of preparation of the tax return "may freely urge the
statement of positions most favorable to the client just as long as there is
112. See STANDARDS OF TAx PRACTICE, supra note 1, 111.02.
113. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965), reprinted in STANDARDS
OF TAx PRACTICE, supra note 1, app. 2001.
114. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 346 (1965),
reprinted in STANDARDS OF TAx PRACTICE, supra note 1, app. 2002.
115. As detailed below, Opinion 314 has been superseded with respect to tax return
advice. Opinion 346 concerns tax shelter opinions, a subject outside the scope of this Article.
116. ABA Formal Op. 314, supra note 113.
117. See ABA Op. 88-352, supra note 1, at 632; Standards of Tax Practice, supra note
1, 214.021.
118. See ABA Formal Op. 314, supra note 113, at 671-72; Durst, supra note 6, at 1030-
32; Rowen, supra note 2, at 248.
119. ABA Formal Op. 314, supra note 113, at 671.




reasonable basis for those positions."123 Moreover, "[W]here the lawyer
believes there is a reasonable basis for a position that a particular transaction
does not result in taxable income, or that certain expenditures are properly
deductible as expenses, the lawyer has no duty to advise that riders be
attached to the client's tax return explaining the circumstances surrounding
the transaction or the expenditures."' 2 4 Opinion 314 did not explicitly
mention a good faith requirement, although the concept of good faith might
be taken as implicit in the reasonable basis standard.
The reasonable basis standard originally may have been intended to set
a fairly high standard.2' Nevertheless, respect for the standard gradually
eroded over the next twenty years. Some only half-facetiously referred to
the standard as the chuckle test or the laugh test-whether the lawyer can
advance the position without chuckling or laughing. 26 Presumably, the
laugh test was even less stringent than the chuckle test, and further erosion
would have led to a guffaw test. By 1985, the reasonable basis standard
had diminished to an understanding by many that it justified the "use of
any colorable claim on a tax return to justify the exploitation of the lottery
of the tax return audit selection process.'
'27
The IRS became concerned that taxpayers were burying questionable
positions on their returns and depending on the audit lottery to protect
them. Moreover, the tax shelter industry exacerbated the problem because
the reasonable basis standard provided fraud insurance for investors in tax
shelters of questionable legitimacy.2 8 Former IRS Commissioner Jerome
Kurtz asserted that a change was needed and implied that a no-fault type
penalty for undisclosed tax return positions might be appropriate to prevent
exploitation of the audit lottery.
29
The ABA Tax Section responded to the perceived problem by suggesting
revisions to Opinion 314.130 The Tax Section proposal disavowed the adver-
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE, supra note 1, 214.02; Harris, supra note 3, at
972.
126. See Falk, supra note 61, at 644; IRS Urged to Rewrite Proposal Tying Ethics
Standard for Tax Return Preparers to Taxpayer Understatement Penalty, Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA), at K-I (Feb. 24, 1987) (quoting Professor Michael Graetz).
127. See ABA Section of Taxation Proposed Revision to Formal Opinion 314 (1984),
reprinted in BERNARD WOLFmAN & JAsS P. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX
PRACTICE 71 (2d ed. 1985) [hereinafter cited as ETHCAL PRoBLEMS].
128. See Jerome Kurtz et al., Discussion on "Questionable Positions", 32 TAX LAW. 13,
15 (1978) (discussing problems of reporting standard).
129. See generally id. at 15-16 (discussing various options to reporting standard problem);
Durst, supra note 6, at 1066 (discussing effect of penalties as financial disincentives for
substantial understatement and noting that former Commissioner Kurtz suggested use of such
penalties to limit number of aggressive positions); Jerome Kurtz, Remarks to the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 103 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at J-3 (May 26, 1977),
reprinted in ETHICAL PROBLEMS, supra note 127, at 60-62 (examining mandatory disclosure of
questionable positions on tax return).
130. See ETICAL PROBLEMS, supra note 127, at 71.
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sarial approach of Opinion 314. The proposal explicitly stated that "a tax
return is not a submission in an adversarial proceeding."'' The nature of
the tax return audit process dictates that most returns wil not be picked
for audit. This means that a taxpayer who resolves all doubts in his own
favor always has an advantage, because the return is not likely to be
audited. In effect, this treatment decides almost all doubtful questions in
favor of the taxpayer. 3 2
The proposal stated that a higher standard than the minimum to avoid
fraud should be expected of the tax lawyer in advising return positions.
The standard adopted by the proposal was that in order to advise a taxpayer
to assert a position on a return, "the position must be a meritorious one.' 33
A position is meritorious if "it is advanced in good faith, as evidenced by
a practical and realistic possibility of success, if litigated."' 34 "The lawyer
must honestly entertain a belief that the position well may be held to be
correct, either on the merits of existing authority or by reversal of existing
authority." 1 35 The proposal required the lawyer to withdraw from represen-
tation when a client insists on reporting a position that does not meet the
meritorious standard
36
The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
used the Tax Section proposal as the basis for Opinion 85-352, which is
now the basic ethical pronouncement for lawyers on advising tax return
positions. 37 However, the committee made several modifications to the Tax
Section proposal. First, the committee eliminated the requirement that the
position be "meritorious," which had been the basis of the Tax Section's
standard. The committee also eliminated the sentence in the Tax Section
proposal which explicitly stated, "A tax return is not a submission in an
adversary proceeding."' 3 Opinion 85-352 basically skirts this issue by stat-
ing, "Although the Model Rules distinguish between the lawyer's roles of
advisor and advocate, both roles are involved here, and the ethical standards
applicable to them provide relevant guidance."' 39 Finally, the committee
131. Id.
132. See STANDARDS OF TAX PPACTCE, supra note 1, 214.01. The Tax Section proposal
stated:
The complications of the tax law, the inadequacy of Internal Revenue Service audits,
the impracticability of training revenue agents to achieve expertness and the flexibility
available to the taxpayer in legitimately resolving to his own advantage numerous
doubtful issues resulting from those complexities, impose a substantial burden on
the government.
ETIncAL PROBLEMS, supra note 127, at 71.
133. ETHICAL PROBLEMS, supra note 127, at 73 (emphasis added).
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 74.
137. ABA Op. 85-352, supra note 1, at 631.
138. See Durst, supra note 6, at 1042-45.
139. ABA Op. 85-352, supra note 1, at 632 (footnote omitted). Moreover, the opinion
lends credence to the adversarial viewpoint by stating further that, "In many cases a lawyer
must realistically anticipate that the filing of the tax return may be the first step in a process
that may result in an adversary relationship between the client and the IRS." Id.
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changed the Tax Section's requirement that a return position have a "prac-
tical and realistic possibility of success" if litigated to a requirement that
the position have "some realistic possibility of success."'
4
Apparently to counteract what it perceived might be adverse inferences
from these modifications by the committee, a special task force of the Tax
Section in turn issued a document stating its own interpretation of Opinion
85-352.'14 The task force report was approved by the Tax Section Committee
on Standards of Tax Practice and approved by the Council of the Section
of Taxation. 42 However, the task force report was not adopted by the ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. 43 Hence,
the task force report's authoritative status is ambiguous. Because ABA rules
have effect only to the extent official state disciplinary bodies adopt the
rules, the ultimate weight accorded to the task force report will be decided
by those bodies and the courts.144
The final ABA standard for advising a tax return position is stated in
Opinion 85-352 as follows:
In summary, a lawyer may advise reporting a position on a return
even where the lawyer believes the position probably will not prevail,
there is no "substantial authority" in support of the position, and
there will be no disclosure of the position in the return. However,
the position to be asserted must be one which the lawyer in good
faith believes is warranted in existing law or can be supported by
a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law. This requires that there is some realistic possibility
of success if the matter is litigated.
145
As noted above, the "meritorious" standard of the Tax Section proposal
is eliminated, along with the Tax Section's description of RPOS as requiring
that the possibility of success be "practical and realistic." The Tax Section
task force interpreting Opinion 85-352 attempted to minimize these differ-
ences by asserting that a possibility of success cannot be "realistic" if it is
only "theoretical or impracticable.'"' 46
Opinion 85-352 does not express the RPOS standard in numerical
percentage terms. Nevertheless, a commonly accepted convention is that
RPOS requires about a one-in-three chance of success. This formulation
apparently derives from the Tax Section task force report. The task force
report stated that "[a] position having only a 5% or 10% likelihood of
140. Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
141. See Report of the Special Task Force on Formal Opinion 85-352, reprinted in 39
TAx LAW. 635, 639 (1986) [hereinafter 85-352 Task Force Report].
142. See STANDARDS OF TAx PRACTICE, supra note 1, 214.02.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. ABA Op. 85-352, supra note 1, at 633-34 (emphasis added).
146. 85-352 Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 638.
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success, if litigated, should not meet the new standard."' 147 But a "position
having a likelihood of success closely approaching one-third should meet
the standard.' 14 The task force report's one-third percentage may have
been meant as a safe harbor. If so, positions with a chance somewhat below
one-third would be sufficient. However, the one-in-three formulation has
been adopted as a minimum standard in the preparer regulations.
49
The foundation of the RPOS standard is good faith. The subjective
requirement of good faith is given an objective aspect by requiring that
there be "some realistic possibility of success if the matter is litigated"
(RPOS). The lawyer need not believe that the position probably will prevail
(more likely than not standard), or that the position is supported by
substantial authority. However, the likelihood of audit or detection is not
a permissible consideration.
The RPOS formulation is based on a litigation standard. Opinion 85-
352 cites as authority ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1, which
deals with the standard for bringing or defending a proceeding. The opinion
itself refers to the possibility of success in "litigation" and states that the
"ethical standards governing the conduct of a lawyer in advising a client
on positions that can be taken in a tax return are no different than those
governing a lawyer's conduct in advising or taking positions for a client in
other civil matters."'10 Moreover, Opinion 85-352 does not abandon the
premise of Opinion 314 that the tax return process is adversarial in nature.'5'
It lends credence to the adversarial approach by explicitly stating that in
many cases "a lawyer must realistically anticipate that the filing of the tax
return may be the first step in a process that may result in an adversary
relationship between the client and the IRS. ''15 2 In contrast, the task force
report asserts, "The Opinion does not state that the general ethical guidelines
governing advocacy in litigation are determinative, or suggest that tax returns
are adversarial proceedings," and the report suggests that Opinion 85-352
merely "blends" the ethical rules governing advocacy and advising. This
may be stretching the actual words of Opinion 85-352 to suit the task
force's own attitude. 15
147. Id. at 638.
148. Id. at 638-39 (emphasis added).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 101.
150. ABA Op. 85-352, supra note 1, at 632.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
152. ABA Op. 85-352, supra note 1, at 632.
153. 85-352 Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 640. The relevant portion of the Task
Force report states:
To the contrary, a tax return initially serves a disclosure, reporting, and self-
assessment function. It is the citizen's report to the government of his or her relevant
activities for the year. The Opinion says that because some returns, particularly
aggressive ones, may result in an adversary relationship, there is a place for
consideration of the ethical considerations regarding advocacy. Thus, the Opinion
blends the ethical guidelines governing advocacy with those applicable to advising,
from which the new ethical standard is derived.
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The text of Opinion 85-352 does not address explicitly the lawyer's
ethical duties with respect to tax planning and advice. The Tax Section's
proposed revision to Opinion 314 stated that the same principles that apply
to advising a return position also should apply to tax planning and advice.
54
Because advising on tax return positions is an inherent part of most tax
planning, Opinion 85-352 appears to apply to tax planning by logical
extension.155 The Tax Section task force report agreed with this understand-
ing, stating that the principles of Opinion 85-352 "should apply to all
aspects of tax practice to the extent tax return positions would be in-
volved."' 56
Here Lawyer's advice clearly comes within the scope of Opinion 85-
352, because the advice pertains directly to a tax return position Client
proposes to take. Consequently, Lawyer must decide whether the one-in-
three RPOS standard is met. Similar considerations apply as have been
discussed with respect to the other standards. The problem is that the only
authority that directly supports Client's position that nonrecourse liabilities
allocated to a partner under the Code section 752 partnership liability
allocation rules are to be included in calculation of insolvency under section
108 is the Tax Section's section 108 task force report.
The question then becomes whether the section 108 task force report
constitutes authority under Opinion 85-352. It appears that the Opinion 85-
352 RPOS standard allows a greater range of authorities to be considered
than do the substantial authority and return preparer standards discussed
previously. 57 The Opinion 85-352 standard refers to a realistic possibility
of success in litigation. Therefore, in applying the Opinion 85-352 standard,
Lawyer also may consider any authorities that a court might consider.15
Consequently, Lawyer may consult sources such as articles and treatises in
making an assessment of the position. Accordingly, the section 108 task
force report should be permissible authority for purposes of Opinion 85-
352. Lawyer also may rely on a "well-reasoned construction of the stat-
ute."' 159 Lawyer's construction of the relevant statutory provisions appears
quite plausible and Lawyer is acting in good faith, the foundation of the
RPOS standard. Consequently, Lawyer may well decide that Client's posi-
tion satisfies the RPOS standard.
Suppose Lawyer decides that the position satisfies the RPOS standard
but falls below the substantial authority standard. This, of course, requires
applying some rather fine mathematical analysis, if one accepts the per-
centage chance of success standards. How does Lawyer distinguish between
154. See ETmCAL PROBLEMS, supra note 127, at 71.
155. See STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE, supra note 1, 214.021.
156. 85-352 Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 636.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 82-86, 104.
158. See STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE, supra note 1, 214.022; Banoff, supra note 61,
at 1117.
159. Cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(ii) (1991) (discussing determination of whether
substantial authority is present).
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a forty percent (substantial authority) and a thirty-three percent (RPOS)
chance of success? Nevertheless, the governing standards seem at least to
sanction, if not require, such an analysis. The Tax Section task force
expressly sanctioned the one-in-three standard, 60 and one also can infer a
percentage chance of success formulation of the substantial authority stan-
dard.1
61
When Lawyer decides that Client's position does not satisfy the sub-
stantial authority standard, but does satisfy ABA RPOS, Opinion 85-352
requires Lawyer to advise Client of the potential penalty and of the
opportunity to avoid the penalty by making adequate disclosure of the
position. 62 If Client decides not to make disclosure, even though substantial
authority does not exist for the position, Lawyer "has met his or her ethical
responsibility with respect to the advice." 16 Therefore, Opinion 85-352
permits Lawyer to advise Client with respect to a position for which Client
may incur a penalty, so long as the position satisfies the RPOS standard.
64
Suppose Lawyer decides that the position falls below the RPOS standard
as well, but Client wants to contest the issue. Opinion 85-352 does not state
explicitly what the lawyer's duty is if the RPOS standard for a position
taken on the tax return is not met. The task force report indicates that the
lawyer is under an obligation to withdraw "from the engagement, at least
to the extent that it involves advice as to the positibn to be taken on the
return."' 65 This is consistent with Model Rule 1.16(a), which provides that
a lawyer must withdraw from representation that will involve the lawyer in
a violation of the rules of professional conduct.'6
The difficulty lies in determining the extent of the representation in this
circumstance. For example, if the advice involves one small aspect of a
business transaction for which the lawyer is the overall advisor, a duty to
withdraw from the entire representation seems harsh. However, it is clear
that the lawyer cannot sign the taxpayer's return that contains the substan-
dard position 67 Moreover, the task force report requires withdrawal from
further representation that "involves advice as to the [substandard] position
to be taken on the return.''16 Accordingly, if the position in question is an
essential though minor part of the transaction, the task force interpretation
may well require withdrawal from the entire representation.
69
160. 85-352 Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 638-39.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92 (discussing stringency of substantial au-
thority standard).
162. ABA Op. 85-352, supra note 1, at 633.
163. Id.
164. Id. The rationale for this apparent anomaly is that the substantial understatement
penalty is basically in the nature of a no-fault penalty. See STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE,
supra note 1, 208.0312; Durst, supra note 6, at 1065-71.
165. 85-352 Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 639.
166. See STANDARDS OF TAX PRAcTicE, supra note 1, 214.0241.
167. See id.
168. 85-352 Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 639.
169. See STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTIcE, supra note 1, 214.0241.
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Lawyer may also advise Client to advance the position by payment of
the tax and filing a refund claim. 170 Under Model Rule 3.1 the lawyer may
assert a position in litigation that is nonfrivolous. Hence, the lawyer may
represent the client in refund proceedings even though the RPOS standard
is not met, as long as the claim is nonfrivolous.' 7 1 However, this is small
solace for the client who cannot possibly pay the potential tax liability and
who is accordingly precluded from making a refund claim.
Another possibility for Client when his return position falls below the
RPOS standard may be to make adequate disclosure of the position.
Adequate disclosure performs an equivocal role in Opinion 85-352. Where
the RPOS standard is met, "the lawyer has no duty to require as a condition
of his or her continued representation that riders be attached to the client's
tax return explaining the circumstances surrounding the transaction."1 7 2
However, the Opinion also requires the lawyer to "counsel the client as to
whether the position is likely to be sustained by a court if challenged by
the IRS, as well as of the potential penalty consequences to the client if
the position is taken on the tax return without disclosure," and further
requires the lawyer to advise the client of the possibility of avoiding the
substantial understatement penalty by disclosure . 7 But that is basically all
the Opinion has to say about disclosure. 74
The Opinion does not state explicitly that disclosure exonerates a
position that fails to meet the RPOS standard (a substandard position). The
Tax Section task force report states that if the RPOS standard is not met,
disclosure will not cure the defect. 175 However, subsequently, the ABA Tax
Section in comments on proposed revisions to Treasury Circular 230 took
the view that taxpayers may take a return position that does not meet the
RPOS standard, provided the position is not frivolous and is either ade-
quately disclosed or presented on an amended return filed as a claim for
refund. 76 Lawyer is consequently in a position of uncertainty with respect
to the possibility of curing the substandard position by disclosure. Opinion
85-352 is silent, and the ABA Tax Section, which has performed a principal
role in interpreting the Opinion, has taken inconsistent positions.
170. 85-352 Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 639.
171. See STANDARDS OF TAx PRACTCE, supra note 1, 214.0241.
172. ABA Op. 85-352, supra note 1, at 633.
173. Id.
174. See id. Of course, in all cases lawyers are under a duty not to "mislead the Internal
Revenue Service deliberately, either by misstatements or by silence or by permitting the client
to mislead." Id.
175. The American Bar Association's Committee on Standards of Tax Practice stated,
"If there is not a realistic possibility of success, if litigated, the new standard could not be
met by disclosure or 'flagging' of the position in the return." 85-352 Task Force Report, supra
note 141, at 639.
176. See Letter of John B. Jones, Jr., Chair, ABA Section of Taxation, to Leslie S.
Shapiro, Director of Practice, Internal Revenue Service (Feb. 12, 1987), reprinted in Paul J.
Sax, Ethics in Tax Practice: Current Issues, 38 TuLANE TAx INsT. ch. 18, at 57 (1988).
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Permitting adequate disclosure to cure a nonfrivolous substandard po-
sition would be in consonance with the goal of diminishing the role of the
audit lottery and would promote the policy of consistency between the
Treasury regulations and the ABA standards. The audit lottery was the
problem that initiated the search for a new tax return standard. Hence,
permitting disclosure would conform to the original purposes for issuance
of Opinion 85-352. Nevertheless, the issue is murky at best.
17 7
C. Circular 230
Circular 230178 governs practice before the Internal Revenue Service.
Circular 230 requires that the practitioner exercise "due diligence" in
preparing, assisting, approving, and filing returns and other documents with
the IRS.' 79 The due diligence standard has been understood to require the
same degree of care and accuracy as the reasonable basis standard under
Opinion 314.10 Because some question existed as to whether Circular 230
governs tax return advice, as opposed to preparation, the proposed amend-
ments to Circular 230 expressly extend Circular 230's reach to tax return
advice.' 8 ' The proposed amendments also would raise the standard for tax
return advice to the "realistic possibility" standard. Under this standard, a
practitioner may advise a tax return position only if the position has a
realistic possibility of being sustained on the merits, or the position is not
frivolous and the practitioner also advises the client to disclose the position
on the return. 82 The changes promote consistency between the Treasury
177. See Sax, supra note 176, at 6-7. Although all the tax return reporting standards
forbid playing the audit lottery, actual practice may well differ. For example, a recent article
explicitly incorporated an audit lottery calculation in formulating a pure economic analysis of
the decision whether voluntarily to make a change from an incorrect to a correct method of
accounting. See W. Eugene Seago et al., The Persuasive Powers of Rev. Proc. 92-20, 56 TAx
NOTES 791 (1992).
178. The Treasury Department is authorized by 31 U.S.C. § 330 to provide practice
standards for all persons who practice before the IRS. These standards are listed in Circular
230.
179. See Circular 230, supra note 18, § 10.22; STANDARDS OF TAx PRACTICE, supra note
1, 217.
180. See STANDARDS OF TAx PRACTICE, supra note 1, 217 (citing Report on Civil Tax
Penalties by Executive Task Force, Commissioner's Penalty Study, Internal Revenue Service,
Tax Notes (Microfiche) Doc. 89-1586 at VIII-3).
181. Proposed Amendments to Circular 230 § 10.34, 57 Ref. Reg. 46,356-01 (1992).
182. Id. The proposed amendments state:
(a) Standard of conduct-l) Realistic possibility standard. A practitioner may
not sign a return as a preparer if the practitioner determines that the return contains
a position that does not satisfy the realistic possibility standard, unless the position
is not frivolous and is adequately disclosed to the Service. A practitioner may not
advise a client to take a position on a return, or prepare the portion of a return on
which a position is taken, unless-
The practitioner determines that there is a realistic possibility of the
position being sustained on its merits (the "realistic possibility standard"); or
The position is not frivolous and the practitioner advises the client to
1993] ADVISING RETURN POSITIONS 619
regulations and Circular 230 and thus enhance the administrative ease with
which practitioners operate our self-assessment system. The Treasury pro-
moted this consistency by accepting public criticism and abandoning an
earlier proposal to adopt a substantial authority standard.1
3
An added concern under Circular 230 is that its violation could disbar
a lawyer from practice before the IRS. Circular 230 authorizes the Secretary
of the Treasury to suspend or disbar from practice before the Code any
practitioner for any of several reasons, among which are disreputable
conduct and failure to comply with Circular 230. 84 Although a disbarred
adequately disclose the position.
(2) Advising clients on potential penalties. A practitioner advising a client to
take a position on a return, or preparing or signing a return as a preparer, must
inform the client of the penalties reasonably likely to apply to the client with respect
to the position, of the opportunity to avoid any such penalty by disclosure, if
relevant, and of the requirements for adequate disclosure.
(3) Relying on information furnished by clients. A practitioner advising a client
to take a position on a return, or preparing or signing a return as a preparer,
generally may rely in good faith without verification upon information furnished by
the client. However, the practitioner may not ignore the implications of information
furnished to, or actually known by, the practitioner, and must make reasonable
inquiries if the information as furnished appears to be incorrect, inconsistent, or
incomplete.
(4) Definitions. For purposes of this section:
(i) Realistic possibility. A position is considered to have a realistic possibility of
being sustained on its merits if a reasonable and well-informed analysis by a
person knowledgeable in the tax law would lead such a person to conclude
that the position has approximately a one in three, or greater, likelihood of
being sustained on its merits. The authorities described in 26 CFR 1.6662-
4(d)(3)(iii) of the substantial understatement penalty regulations may be taken
into account for purposes of this analysis. The possibility that a position will
not be challenged by the Service (e.g., because the taxpayer's return may not
be audited or because the issue may not be raised on audit) may not be
taken into account.
(ii) Frivolous. A position is frivolous if it is patently improper.
(b) Standard of discipline. As provided in § 10.52, only violations of this section
that are willful, reckless, or a result of gross incompetence will subject a practitioner
to suspension or disbarment from practice before the Service. [Reg. § 10.34.]
Id.
183. See IRS Urged to Rewrite Proposal Tying Ethics Standard for Tax Return Preparers
to Taxpayer Understatement Penalty, Daily Tax Rep. No. 35 (BNA), Feb. 24, 1987 p. K-I;
IRS' Director of Practice Clashes With CPAs Over Proposed Ethics Standard, Daily Tax Rep.
No. 233 (BNA), Dec. 4, 1986 p. G-2.
184. See Circular 230, supra note 17, § 10.50. Circular 230 also might come into play
when a practitioner incurs the preparer penalty. Until enactment of the Revenue Reconciliation
Act of 1989, 103 Stat. 2301 (1989), conduct which resulted in the imposition of penalties had
been regarded as "disreputable conduct," although not expressly enumerated as such in Circular
230. See generally Steven C. Salch, Tax Practice Ethics: Practitioner Discipline and Sanctions,
C690 ALI-ABA 157 (1991) (discussing ethical problems for tax practitioner in light of various
standards and sources, including Circular 230). The Internal Revenue Manual 4297.9 required
automatic referral to the Director of Practice of practitioners subject to the preparer penalty.
See STANDARDS OF TAx PRAcTiCE, supra note I, 308.062. Consequently, imposition of a
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practitioner generally can continue to prepare returns, no other person
eligible to practice before the IRS may continue to be associated in practice
with the disbarred practitioner."' Thus, the disbarred practitioner's partners
could be subject to discipline if they continue in association with the
disbarred practitioner.'16 Moreover, because the Treasury Director of Prac-
tice may notify state disciplinary authorities of the suspension or disbarment
of a practitioner, state disciplinary action may ensue upon violation of
Circular 230.87 Obviously, violation of Circular 230 can result in the loss
of a lawyer's livelihood.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
In the relatively simple case discussed above, Lawyer, acting in good
faith, faces a client on the brink of financial ruin, a theoretically plausible
tax return position that could pull Client from the brink, little direct
authority with respect to the position, and a profusion of vague standards
governing the propriety of advising Client to take the position. Client should
be entitled to contest the issue prior to paying the tax.' 8 Moreover, Client
ought to be entitled to retain legal counsel in carrying out that contest,
since the ability to contest such a complex issue is of little value without
the assistance of counsel.
Yet, if the position falls below the RPOS standard, Opinion 85-352
requires Lawyer to withdraw if Client takes the position, thereby depriving
Client of counsel even if the position has a reasonable basis and is not
frivolous.' 9 For Client, the alternative of paying the tax and claiming a
refund is unavailable for all practical purposes. In this case, sound reasons
exist to believe that the position conforms to all the applicable standards,
but that is by no means certain. If Lawyer advises Client to take the
position, he will be doing so with at least some degree of uncertainty
preparer penalty might also result in discipline under Circular 230. Administrative recommen-
dations to the IRS appearing in the Conference Report on the Revenue Reconciliation Act of
1989 criticized this practice. See H.R. REP. No. 386, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 661-63 (1989). The
Conference Report stated that the IRS should refer to the Director of Practice only those
matters which involve willful conduct or a pattern of failure to meet required standards. Id.
Presumably, penalties will no longer be referred automatically to the Director of Practice
unless they meet the criteria set out in the Conference Report. However, in those cases meeting
the Conference Report criteria, the exposure to discipline on account of imposition of the
preparer penalty remains.
185. See STANDARDs oF TAX PRACTICE, supra note 1, 117.0154. Circular 230 § 10.51(h)
prohibits any practitioner from maintaining a partnership for the practice of law, accountancy,
or related professions with a person who is under disbarment from the IRS. STANDARDs OF
TAX PRACTiCE, supra note 1, 117.0154.
186. STANDARDs OF TAX PRACTiCE, supra note 1, 117.0154.
187. Id. The Treasury Director of Practice has entered into agreements with several states
to provide for notification of state authorities in the event of suspension or disbarment of an
individual licensed in the state. Leslie S. Shapiro, Management and Operation of the Office
of Director of Practice, 43 N.Y.U. FED. TAx INsT. 11-1, 11-11 (1985).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 162-66.
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concerning whether it meets all the standards. Moreover, in the case of the
ABA RPOS standard, it may be that making disclosure of the position will
not cure a substandard position.' 90 Thus, even a fully disclosed position
having a reasonable basis, say a one-in-four chance of success, may be
substandard under the ABA RPOS standard.
While there has been considerable improvement over the past decade
or so in articulation of tax return advice and preparation standards, there
is still room for considerable improvement. As analysis of a simple case
illustrates, the area is still plagued by too many different standards, uncer-
tainty, and inconsistency with the premise that taxpayers should have a
prepayment forum in which to contest tax liability. Furthermore, the trend
in the past several years has been to place the Lawyer more and more into
the role of overseer of the client's conduct, in effect conscripting the lawyer
as part of the government's enforcement mechanisms. Some may see this
development as desirable. However, it can conflict with the lawyer's duty
to the client, and carried to the extreme, could do serious damage to the
lawyer-client relationship. 91
Shifting more of the burden of enforcing the compliance system to
practitioners involves imposing greater economic costs on practitioners and
clients who are making good faith efforts to comply with statutory standards
governing their conduct. The policy focus of efforts over the past several
years to improve tax return position standards was on the "bad guys" who
played the audit lottery, particularly with respect to tax shelters, by taking
questionable positions they hoped would win in the audit lottery. 92 The
time may have come to focus tax policy more on the "good guys,"
practitioners and clients who make good faith efforts to comply with a
complex tax law that often defies human understanding.
It also may be time to pay more attention to the problems confronted
by the lawyer in a small or mid-sized firm, who may lack the resources of
a lawyer in a large firm. It is apparent from reading the literature that the
tax practice standards area is dominated by large firm practitioners who
represent the ABA and the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants (AICPA). This orientation cannot help but affect the development of
tax practice standards toward more complex and time-consuming require-
ments.
The approach should be from the standpoint of the conscientious
practitioner who is not pushing the line, who sometimes takes aggressive
but supportable positions, and who is not necessarily part of the ABA elite.
These lawyers may welcome better standards, because that would relieve
190. See supra text accompanying notes 172-77.
191. The tendency to put the lawyer in the role of the client's policeman is not confined
to the tax field. See Philip A. Lacovara, Follow the Money, WASH. PosT, July 21, 1992, at
A19 (criticizing government actions holding lawyers and accountants liable for savings and
loan losses).
192. See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (discussing questionable return posi-
tions).
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pressure and competition from less scrupulous practitioners. Zeal to put a
stop to undoubtedly questionable practices should not blind policymakers
to the problems that proposed solutions may cause to compliant practitioners
and taxpayers, who remain in the vast majority.
Although these problems, particularly the problem of uncertainty, never
can be completely obviated, they can be diminished. Following are some
suggestions for possible improvements. This is not to say that the goal
should be a perfect system. The goal is progress, not perfection, for often
the perfect is the enemy of the good. What this article suggests are
improvements that should make the self-assessment system simpler and more
workable.
A. Adopt a Uniform Standard for All Purposes
There should be a single uniform reporting standard for all purposes.
This is not a novel suggestion. 93 One of the most difficult problems the
practitioner faces is the proliferation of standards for tax return advice.
There are at least six reporting standards enunciated by various sources
ranging from more-likely-than-not correct to nonfrivolous. 194 The differences
among some of the reporting standards are quite subtle. Whatever purposes
having these different standards may serve are outweighed by the compliance
effort they demand and the confusion they engender.
Simply familiarizing oneself sufficiently with the nuances of all the
relevant standards involves an inordinate amount of effort that, as a
practical matter, many busy practitioners may "be unable or unwilling to
expend. Furthermore, the differences between some standards, such as RPOS
and substantial authority, are easy enough to state generally but perplexing
actually to apply. To be honest, no one really can say with any degree of
assurance that a position has a forty percent chance of success as opposed
to a thirty-three percent chance. And no one would be able to discern the
difference between RPOS and reasonable basis in the absence of the Tax
Section task force's telling us what it is. 195 The whole area is in danger of
becoming bogged down in ever-expanding degrees of refinement, as poli-
cymakers become increasingly enamored with the subtlety and elegance of
their own formulations.
The most appropriate standard for tax return positions would seem to
be the ABA Opinion 85-352 RPOS standard with a minor modification.
The modification would eliminate the ABA standard's focus on success in
litigation. Instead, the standard would require "a good faith belief that the
tax return position under consideration has a realistic possibility of being
sustained administratively or judicially on its merits if challenged."' 191 The
193. See Zelenak, supra note 50, at 472; Banoff & Coustan, supra note 55, at 155.
194. See Appendix-Reporting Standards, infra.
195. See 85-352 Task Force Report, supra note 141, at 638-39.
196. See Letter of John B. Jones, Jr., Chair, ABA Section of Taxation, to Leslie S.
Shapiro, Director of Practice, Internal Revenue Service (Feb. 12, 1987), reprinted in Sax, supra
note 176, at 57, 58.
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change from focusing purely on a position's chance of success if litigated
to also considering a position's chance of being sustained administratively
takes into account the fact that most tax cases are decided at the adminis-
trative level. Moreover, most tax returns are not prepared by lawyers. Any
uniform standard necessarily would apply to many nonlawyers who are not
trained to take into account the hazards of litigation. The broader focus
takes this into account.
Some consensus exists among practitioners with respect to the appro-
priateness of the RPOS standard. Representatives of both the ABA and
AICPA joined in urging such a standard on the Treasury for purposes of
Circular 230.197 Most practitioners seem to approve of the RPOS standard.
This consensus supports adoption of the RPOS standard. Practitioners
should not be subject to sanctions for actions that are consistent with
"thoughtfully developed and appropriate professional standards of behav-
ior."' 9s The RPOS standard seems more appropriate than the two possible
alternatives, the substantial authority and reasonable basis standards. As
currently interpreted, the substantial authority standard limits too severely
the authority which may be consulted under that standard. 199 Reasonable
basis, while it may have been an appropriate standard as originally under-
stood, has been eroded to such an extent that it is no longer usable as the
basic norm.2
The RPOS standard still is subject to the criticism that, as interpreted
by the Tax Section task force, it incorporates a percentage chance of success
test (one-in-three). Some practitioners and scholars have doubted the feas-
ibility of applying such a test in practice. 201 Task forces of both the ABA
Tax Section and the AICPA have commented critically on the use of a
percentage standard. 2  Some have compared it to a spin of the roulette
197. See id.; Letter of Leonard Podolin, Chairman, AICPA Responsibilities in Tax
Practice Subcommittee, to Leslie S. Shapiro, Director of Practice, Internal Revenue Service
(Feb. 13, 1987), reprinted in Sax, supra note 176, at 79, 82.
198. Banoff & Coustan, supra note 55, at 155.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80, and infra notes 198-212 and accompanying
text.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
201. See T.D. 8381, supra note 48, at 67,494; Banoff & Coustan, supra note 55, at 156-
57.
202. The ABA Tax Section Civil Penalties Task Force, commenting on use of RPOS as
the benchmark for the preparer penalty, stated:
The Task Force believes that the proposed definition of "realistic possibility of being
sustained on its merits" is ill advised. While a numerical indicator such as "one-in-
three" may be useful to give a feel for the standard, it provides no concrete guidance
to the professional practitioner or to the Service or a court whether or when the
standard is breached. It is a standard that does not turn on a legal or technical
analysis. Rather, it is inherently arbitrary.
Letter from ABA Section on Taxation Civil Penalties Task Force to Fred T. Goldberg,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 91 TAx NoTes TODAY 123-46, June 7, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file. Therefore, one Tax Section Task force has called into
question the very one-in-three benchmark that another Task Force interpreting Opinion 85-
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wheel or roll of the dice. 2 3 However, use of such percentages now seems
entrenched, and practitioners do make such estimates among themselves
when assessing possible courses of action.
Finally, the standard continues the element of good faith as a basis for
the standard. The system should encourage good faith efforts at compliance,
not punish them. Although this involves an element of subjectivity, it is
unfair and ultimately self-defeating for the system to impose sanctions on
practitioners who make good faith efforts to comply.
B. Allow All Authorities to be Considered
One of the principal criticisms of the substantial authority standard is
that it limits the authorities upon which the taxpayer can depend in assessing
a return position. The regulations under section 6694 extend application of
this limited list to the preparer penalty. 204 Although the list of permissible
authorities has expanded to include materials such as letter rulings and the
Blue Book, the list still excludes conclusions reached in secondary sources
such as treatises and articles.
205
The IRS claims it would be "too difficult to administratively determine
which secondary sources were well-reasoned or were otherwise accurate
expressions of the tax law." 2 Perhaps the IRS does not want to be "at
the mercy of Prentice-Hail or CCH or every law review editor in country."2w
However, it is undeniable that practitioners routinely consult secondary
352 advanced. See supra text accompanying notes 147-79.
A task force of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Tax Division
concluded that a mathematical approach to return standards is inappropriate. Sheldon I.
Banoff, Determining and Weighing Valid Legal Authority to Avoid Accuracy-Related and
Preparer Penalties: The Proposed Regulations Continue the Controversy, 69 TAxEs 259, 284
(1991).
203. See Banoff & Coustan, supra note 55, at 137. One tax expert declared:
The more tax cases I read, the more uncomfortable I become at guessing at the
probable outcome of the hypothetical controversy. Had I been asked to guess at the
chances of success of the taxpayers in Selfe [872 F.2d 519 (11th Cir. 1986)]
(guaranteed loan and S corporation basis), Lessinger [872 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1989)]
(excess liabilities in Section 351 transaction), or Soliman [94 T.C. 20 (1990)] (the
focal point test for the home office deduction), I would have put each of their
chances for success at well below one in three.
Banoff, supra note 202, at 284 n.212 (quoting RABY REPORT ON TAX PRACTCE, June 1990,
at 7).
204. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(2).
205. See supra text accompanying notes 84-86 (discussing substantial authority definition
and continued exclusion of treatises and articles as authority).
206. T.D. 8382, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,511 (1991) (codified at Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6694-0 to 1.6694-
4); see Banoff & Coustan, supra note 55, at 161-62 (discussing IRS's rejection of secondary
material as authority).
207. See Banoff & Coustan, supra note 55, at 162 n.180 (quoting Professor Lawrence
Zelenak in Minutes of Meeting of ABA Section of Taxation Committee on Standards of Tax
Practice (Washington, D.C., May 17, 1991)).
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sources such as Bittker & Eustice2°s in the corporate tax area and McKee,
Nelson & Whitmire2 in the partnership area. Courts also consult and cite
such authorities. 210 Finally, the standards of both the ABA 211 and the
AICPA2 2 sanction resort to secondary authority.
The reality is that everybody uses secondary sources. They are cited by
taxpayers and the IRS in audits and at the appellate level. Everyday tax
return preparers and even more sophisticated advisors are forced to rely on
them.2 1 1 Given the amount and complexity of new legislation over the past
several years, there often is simply no authority interpreting a given Code
provision. 214 The tax advisor is left with no choice but to depend on the
208. BORIS I. BrrTR & JAMS S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS (5th ed. 1987).
209. McKEE r AL., supra note 68.
210. E.g., Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 148 n.2 (1960); Clavidge Apartments Co.
v. Commissioner, 323 U.S. 141, 146 n.9 (1944); Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 373 n.4
(1943). Professor Bittker points out:
[O]nce a court has decided to look beyond the four corners of the statute, there are
no formal restrictions on the material that may be taken into account in interpreting
the statutory language.... Thus, courts in federal tax cases look not only to such
formal sources of legislative history as committee reports and legislative debates but
also to less formal sources such as hearings, memoranda by trade groups, and
commentators.
BORIS I. BITTER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAxATION OF INCOME, ESTATES, AND GIFTS
4.2.2 (2d ed. 1989).
211. The ABA RPOS standard, by basing the norm on possible success in litigation,
sanctions resort to whatever authority a court might consider. Courts often consider secondary
authority. See supra note 210 (discussing how courts use secondary authority).
212. AICPA Statements on Responsibilities in Tax Practice, Statement No. 1 provides:
For example, the CPA may reach a conclusion on the basis of well-reasoned articles,
treatises, IRS General Counsel Memoranda, a General Explanation of a Revenue
Act prepared by the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, and Internal Revenue
Service written determinations (for example, private letter rulings), whether or not
such sources are treated as "authority" under section 6661.
Id. § .07. AICPA Interpretation 1-1 states:
In determining whether a tax return position meets the CPA's realistic possibility
standard, a CPA may rely on authorities in addition to those evaluated in determining
whether substantial authority exists. Accordingly, CPAs may rely on well-reasoned
treatises, articles in recognized professional tax publications, and other reference
tools and sources of tax analysis commonly used by tax advisors and return preparers.
Id. § .07, quoted in Banoff & Coustan, supra note 55, at 160 n.167.
213. See Banoff & Coustan, supra note 55, at 160, 162; Johnson, supra note 43, at 1526:
In determining whether a legal position is likely to prevail, a model taxpayer
sometimes has to rely on good tax theory, wise commentators, and public speeches
by Treasury or congressional officials, even if such "quasi-law" sources do not
technically qualify as "authority."
Id.
214. See Letter of John B. Jones, Jr., Chair, ABA Section of Taxation, to Leslie S.
Shapiro, Director of Practice, Internal Revenue Service (Feb. 13, 1987) (transmitting Comments
on Notice of Proposed Rule Making Under 31 CFR, Part 10 (Circular 230)), reprinted in Sax,
supra note 76, at 68, 72.
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advisor's own analysis of the provision and that of learned colleagues
published in the professional literature.
21
1
For example, for years no cases existed interpreting Code section 305
governing stock dividends, and the regulations left many questions unan-
swered. The Bittker & Eustice treatise contained an excellent analysis of
Code section 305 .216 In the many situations that might arise in which Code
section 305 could expose the client to tax, the tax advisor almost certainly
would consult the treatise. In the case under discussion here, the only
directly relevant authority Lawyer has with respect to the inclusion of
partnership nonrecourse liabilities in the calculation of a partner's insolvency
is the ABA Tax Section section 108 task force report.217 Presumably the
authors of the task force report are among the more knowledgeable prac-
titioners with respect to the issue under consideration. Their opinion should
bear some weight in the substantial authority analysis. It would be silly to
say that Lawyer cannot rely on the task force report because it is not
permissible authority. In reality, courts and practitioners use this type of
authority every day. A uniform tax return advice standard should not deny
that reality.
The Service concedes that practitioners may rely on the "authorities
underlying the conclusions in the secondary sources," as contrasted to the
conclusions themselves. 218 This may be a distinction without a difference.
In the absence of primary authority, the practitioner must rely on a "well-
reasoned" construction of the statute as authority. But well-reasoned stat-
utory constructions are precisely what many secondary sources attempt to
provide. Should lawyers not consider the well-reasoned construction in an
article, treatise, or task force report? In addition, if an article does cite
authority that underlies the article's conclusions, the article inevitably will
contain a reasoned analysis of that authority, which in turn should qualify
as a well-reasoned analysis of the statute that the cited authority interprets.
If that is so, there is little reason to retain the distinction between conclusions
in a secondary source and the authorities underlying those conclusions.
C. Permit Disclosure to Cure a Substandard Position
Adequate disclosure currently cures a nonfrivolous substandard position
under the negligence, disregard of rules and regulations, substantial under-
statement, and preparer penalties. 2 9 However, ABA Opinion 85-352 does
215. See Banoff & Coustan, supra note 55, at 160.
216. See BoRuis I. BrrTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL iNcomE TAXATION OF CORPO-
RATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 7.62 (4th ed. 1979).
217. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
218. T.D. 8382, supra note 206, at 67,511.
219. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c) (1991) (governing negligence or disregard of rules or
regulations); § 1.6662-4(a), (e), (f) (as amended 1992) (governing substantial understatement);
§ 1.6994-2(c), (e) (as amended 1992) (governing preparer penalties). The AICPA Statements
on Responsibilities in Tax Practice also provide that adequate disclosure cures a nonfrivolous
substandard position. AICPA Statements of Responsibility in Tax Practice, Statement No. 1
§ .09 (1988), reprinted in STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTiCE 2006.
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not address expressly the effect of adequate disclosure on a substandard
position, and some ambiguity exists concerning the effect of adequate
disclosure under Opinion 85-352.20 Adequate disclosure of a substandard
position should relieve a taxpayer or practitioner of sanctions in all cases,
except where the position is frivolous. In addition, the definition of a
frivolous position should be changed to require a lack of good faith.
The main impetus for tightening return position standards was the fear
of taxpayers' taking advantage of the audit lottery by taking undisclosed
substandard positions, especially with respect to tax shelters. 22 Adequate
disclosure removes one of the principal weapons of the taxpayer taking
advantage of the audit lottery by removing the possibility of burying the
position on the return.
Some have expressed concern that disclosure of all substanard positions
would result in a new audit lottery for taxpayers who take questionable
positions but seek to avoid sanctions through disclosure. 2n This is indeed a
possibility. However, disclosure is normally evidence of good faith. Allowing
disclosure to give absolution for a substandard position would protect the
taxpayer and practitioner who make a good faith compliance effort, but
are unable to determine the correctness of their position with certainty.
The administrative burden on the Service might be lessened by including
more properly designed questions and checkoffs on the return than presently
exist2 3 For example, a taxpayer submitting a Form 8275 might have to so
indicate by checking a box on the front page of the return?24 In any event,
if increased amounts of disclosure overwhelm the IRS, such a system's
failures would be considerably more serious than any amount of tinkering
with return position standards could cure. Because disclosure absolves the
taxpayer and practitioner in many cases now, extending the absolution to
nonfrivolous positions for all purposes should not be inordinately unwieldy.
Allowing adequate disclosure as a cure also would avoid the existing
problem under the ABA's RPOS standard of a lawyer having to withdraw
from representation of a taxpayer who has a nonfrivolous position that
falls below the RPOS standard. A lawyer could continue to represent the
client, provided the client made adequate disclosure. This would promote
the fundamental right of the taxpayer to contest an issue prior to payment
of the tax. The present situation can frustrate the taxpayer's ability to
220. See supra text accompanying notes 172-77 (discussing uncertainties in ABA Op. 85-
352).
221. See Jerome Kurtz, Notes to a New Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 12 TAX NoTEs
1195, 1196 (1981) (citing tax shelters as "progeny" of reasonable basis standard), quoted in
Johnson, supra note 43, at 1527; Kurtz et al., supra note 128, at 14-15. See generally Rowen,
supra note 2.
222. IRS' Director of Practice Clashes with CPAs Over Proposed Ethics Standard, Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA), Dec. 4, 1986, available in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, BNADTR File.
223. See Kurtz et al., supra note 128, at 18-19 (discussing possibility of adding more
questions to tax forms).
224. William L. Raby, Fact or Fantasy? Contemplating Tax Practice in the Year 2000,
55 TAx NoTEs 1115, 1118 (1992).
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pursue a reasonable legal claim by requiring prepayment of the tax or
denying taxpayer legal counsel (where the lawyer is required to withdraw
because of a nonfrivolous substandard position).? Requiring lawyers to
withdraw when clients take nonfrivolous substandard return positions also
may retard development of the law by discouraging novel positions.
226
Finally, the definition of a frivolous position should be changed to
exclude any position that is taken in good faith. The final regulations
interpreting the accuracy-related and preparer penalties rejected comments
to the proposed regulations suggesting a subjective good-faith standard on
the ground that a purely objective standard is more appropriate. 227 Again,
however, where a taxpayer or practitioner makes disclosure in the good
faith belief that the position is not frivolous, that individual may be ignorant
but is not a fit subject for punishment m
D. Impose a Compliance Toll Charge on Taxpayers and the IRS
The substantial understatement penalty originally was suggested as a
no-fault penalty for playing the audit lottery.229 To the extent that a taxpayer
now can make a reasonable cause and good faith defense against that
penalty, the no-fault aspect has been abrogated. In addition to adopting a
uniform RPOS standard, Congress, the Treasury, and the ABA should
eliminate the substantial understatement penalty. Nevertheless, some penalty
or charge to compensate for the cost of enforcement ought to be imposed
on taxpayers who take undisclosed positions tfiat fall below the uniform
RPOS standard, even if they act in good faith. The charge should be
imposed in every case where the taxpayer owes a deficiency due to an
undisclosed position regardless of whether the uniform RPOS standard is
met.
The suggested charge is not in the nature of a penalty or a tax, but
rather a reimbursement to compensate the government for its costs connected
225. See Trucksess, supra note 91, at 745-48 (discussing various criticism of practitioners
due to IRS's linkage of Circular 230 standards and substantial understatement penalties of
Code).
226. Id.
227. T.D. 8381, supra note 48, at 67,494-95. The ABA Tax Section Task Force on Civil
Penalties suggested a definition of frivolous as "not litigable." Under the task force formu-
lation,
[a] position is litigable only if, to the best of the taxpayer's knowledge, information
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, it is well-grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal
of existing law, and is not interposed for any improper purpose.
Letter from ABA Section on Taxation Civil Penalties Task Force to Fred T. Goldberg,
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 91 Tax Notes Today 123-46, June 7, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT File. This formulation, of course, incorporates a good faith
criterion.
228. The theological formulation of this is that an individual is not culpable for wrongs
committed in invincible ignorance.
229. See supra note 93 (suggesting that substantial understatement penalty was originally
no-fault penalty).
ADVISING RETURN POSITIONS
with income tax enforcement. 0 The toll charge should be low13 1 to reflect
its nature as a compensatory toll charge rather than a penalty. The costs
of tax system enforcement should be placed on taxpayers who fail to make
disclosure rather than on those who disclose.
By the same token, what is sauce for the goose also should be sauce
for the gander. Costs incurred by the taxpayer on account of the IRS
asserting incorrect positions against the taxpayer are more properly allocated
to the government than to the taxpayer. Hence, a similar toll charge should
be imposed on the IRS when it asserts an incorrect deficiency and the
taxpayer is found to owe no additional tax, to compensate the taxpayer for
costs connected with the enforcement proceeding. These toll-charges would
allocate the cost of enforcement to those responsible for the costs.
V. CONCLUSION
Our system of taxation is a voluntary one. To be sure, some pay because
of a sense of duty and civic pride, some pay because they fear the
repercussions of not paying, and others do not pay at all unless they are
caught. It is apparent that the latter two groups are a less efficient source
of income than the first. Taxpayers and practitioners are more likely to
comply willingly with the income tax if they understand the "rules of the
game." The importance of preparer and taxpayer standards is that they
greatly narrow the universe of results among similarly situated taxpayers.
The key to tax policy in the preparer and taxpayer compliance area is the
promotion of consistent, understandable rules that encourage the voluntary
compliance upon which our self-assessment system is founded.
230. See Rev. Proc. 93-1, 1991-1 I.R.B. 333 (providing users fees for private letter rulings).
231. One commentator has suggested a level of five to seven percent. See Johnson, supra
note 43, at 1530.
1993]







































































0-5% Patently improper Does not absolve
* A recent proposal by the Clinton Administration would replace the "not
frivolous" standard with a "reasonable basis" standard.
Frivolous
